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Extant literature investigating the relationship between legal and illegal work 
is expansive, spanning various disciplines using a wide array of methodological 
specifications. Despite this expansiveness legal and illegal work has traditionally 
been viewed as tradeoffs whereby legal work is seen as a catalyst to moving away 
from illegal work. However, bifurcation of legal and illegal work captures only one 
facet of the relationship between the two. For example, participating in legal and 
illegal work contemporaneously has been discussed by a number of scholars and has 
been observed in empirical studies.  But detailed investigation into the legal and 
illegal overlap has been scant. By using the Pathways to Desistance Study, there were 
three main goals of the current study. The first goal was to document the 
heterogeneous patterns of legal and illegal work and how they overlap over time. 
Second, I examined if legal economic opportunities were associated with membership 




third goal was to consider if the legal and illegal overlap was associated with key 
criminal career dimensions: frequency of offending and offending variety. Results 
showed that there are heterogeneous patterns in both legal work and illegal work and 
the way in which they were linked. There was some support for the relationship 
between legal economic opportunities and membership in a higher illegal work group. 
The legal and illegal overlap was associated with a lower frequency of offending and 
endorsement of fewer types of instrumental crimes. Results were discussed in terms 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over thirty years ago, Sviridoff and Thompson (1983) were among the first to 
describe the complex nature of the relationship between legal and illegal work. They 
interviewed 61 adult, male prisoners from New York City’s Rikers Island about their 
experiences prior to and after incarceration. Sviridoff and Thompson (1983) found 
three main types of relationships between legal and illegal work: Work that averts 
crime, occurs when work and crime are mutually exclusive activities (although the 
respondents reported considerable illegal income during periods when they were not 
working). For individuals in this group, legal and illegal work tended to have the 
effect of dampening involvement in the other and therefore Sviridoff and Thompson 
(1983) argued that more or better work opportunities might be effective as a crime 
deterrent for members of this group.  Work that is concurrent with crime, occurs 
when work and crime were not mutually exclusive activities. Legal and illegal work 
can overlap for a number of reasons:  For some in this group, work had become a way 
of expanding or enhancing illegal activities. For others, legal and illegal work simply 
did not interfere with each other. Work could also be used as a cover or expansion for 
illegal work.   Discouraged workers are individuals who have given up on legitimate 
work altogether and immersed themselves in illegal work. Given their findings, 
Sviridoff and Thompson (1983: 208; 212) urged researchers and program developers 
to “acknowledge the extreme variety that remains regardless of attempts at 
simplification… the concept of an automatic opposition between employment and 





 Today, the literature on legal and illegal work is expansive, spanning various 
disciplines using a wide array of methodological specifications. Despite this 
expansiveness, scholars have largely focused on examining how work averts crime.  
That is, legal and illegal work have traditionally been viewed as tradeoffs and legal 
work is seen as a catalyst to moving away from illegal work or in the case of 
intensive adolescent work, can induce problem behavior among adolescents. 
Unfortunately, emphasis on the opposition between legal and illegal work captures 
only one facet of how legal work is associated with illegal work. For example, 
participating in both legal and illegal work contemporaneously has been discussed by 
a number of scholars and has been observed in empirical studies but detailed 
investigation into legal and illegal overlap has been scant. The purpose of this study is 
to fill this important gap in our knowledge about the relationship between legal and 
illegal work by examining an understudied phenomenon – the overlap between legal 
and illegal work.  
 The dearth of attention on the overlap between legal and illegal work is not 
without consequence. First, more attention to the legal and illegal overlap can provide 
a broader theoretical understanding of the nature of crime generally and moves away 
from what Laub and Sampson (2001:13) call “simplistic, rigid offender/non-offender 
categories.” Many traditional criminological approaches, with some exceptions, have 
focused on the mutual exclusivity of legal and illegal activities. Notable exceptions 
include rational choice perspectives and Matza’s (1964) theory of drift. The second 
chapter will discuss these theoretical perspectives, and others that directly tackle the 





traditional theories cannot account for such behaviors but in general, there is a strong 
tendency for theoretical and empirical work to emphasize the differences between 
legal and illegal work.  
 Second, it is rare for offenders to be involved in stable, legal work for 
extended periods of time. As Sampson and Laub (2005) point out employment is the 
type of event which is frequently recurring—people repeatedly move in and out of 
employment over the life course. Similarly, scholars have established that there are 
within-individual changes over time in offending (Horney and Marshall, 1991; 
Horney. Osgood and Marshall, 1995; Nagin and Land, 1993). Thus, it is not 
uncommon for offenders to participate in both legal and illegal work, and oftentimes 
overlapping the two (Freeman, 1999). Understanding the factors that are associated 
with membership between legal and illegal work can contribute to both theory and 
policy effectiveness.  
Third, the legal and illegal overlap might be associated with quantitatively and 
qualitatively different offending patterns than engaging in illegal work only. 
Specifically, the legal and illegal overlap might be associated with differences in key 
criminal career dimensions, such as offending frequency and offending variety. It is 
important to examine the relationship between participation in legal and illegal work 
and criminal career dimensions, because it can shed light on where the legal and 
illegal overlap is situated in the criminal career. For example, a lower frequency of 
offending might suggest that the overlap is associated with less commitment to the 
criminal milieu and even perhaps is an intermediate step in the desistance process 





different types of offenses compared with engaging in illegal work only, it can be 
informative for both theory and policy. 
 Finally, a better understanding of the legal and illegal work overlap has 
important policy implications. Employment has been identified as a key factor in the 
desistance process and successful reintegration (Sampson and Laub, 1993; Uggen, 
2000).  Thus, millions of dollars annually are invested in custodial and non-custodial 
employment programs (Uggen and Wakefield, 2008). Even with such an investment, 
the effectiveness of non-custodial employment programs is equivocal. Visher, 
Winterfield and Coggeshal (2005) examined eight experimental evaluations of non-
custodial employment programs and found that overall all eight of the interventions 
had no significant effect on likelihood that the participant would be re-arrested. 
Wilson, Gallagher and MacKenzie (2000) meta-analyzed 33 experimental and quasi-
experimental evaluations of education, vocation, and work programs and found that 
participants recidivate at a lower rate than non-participants. The results however were 
greater for education programs than work programs. The limitations of the studies 
made it difficult to attribute the positive effects to the program. In his overview of the 
economics of crime, Freeman (1999) stated that contrary to the expectations of many 
analysts and the public, joblessness is not the overwhelming determinant of crime.  
He argued that perhaps one of the major reasons why the relationship between 
joblessness and crime is not strong is that crime and legitimate work are not exclusive 
activities. 
 Examination of the legal work and illegal work overlap can potentially 





effects of employment on subsequent criminal behavior of individual programs have 
largely relied on evaluating randomized experimental designs and suggest that 
employment has differential effects on offending depending on age, types of crime 
and social roles. Uggen (2000) used data from the National Supported Work 
Demonstration Project to estimate event history models to examine the effect of work 
on self-reported recidivism. Uggen found significant effects of work only for 
offenders age 26 or older. Recently, Uggen and Shannon (2014) found that supported 
work programs reduce robbery and burglary but not cocaine or heroin use. Work also 
tends to have stronger effects for offenders who are married or have children (Uggen, 
Manza and Behrens, 2004). What these findings suggest is that estimating the mean 
impact of particular work programs in the form of a singular, singular population 
average treatment effect (PATE) learned from an experimental intervention on the 
population as a whole is perhaps misleading, or at minimum obfuscating important 
response heterogeneity among different individuals. In fact, some of the key 
questions of interest to policy makers concern factors that condition the success of 
social programs (Heckman and Smith, 1995). This is observed in the work evaluation 
literature. When researchers look at moderating effects, there is evidence that work 
programs can be effective under certain circumstances. Therefore, understanding the 
heterogeneity in treatment effects is potentially helpful to unraveling the effectiveness 
of work programs. 
 Taken together, the relationship between legal and illegal work can be 
multifaceted. Extant theoretical and empirical literature has focused heavily on what 





individuals away from illegal work. Yet, researchers have long observed that a good 
number of individuals engage in both legal and illegal contemporaneously. Despite 
this consistent observation, inquiry into the nature of the legal and illegal overlap has 
been limited. This dearth in inquiry has important consequences for both theory and 
policy. Theoretically, expanding the conceptualization of the nature of legal and 
illegal work can reveal novel patterns in criminal behavior. In terms of policy, 
research into the dual nature of legal and illegal work can potentially inform criminal 
justice policies regarding the processing of individuals who are arrested but also have 
a legal job. Moreover, it can shed light on the heterogeneous effects of work 
programs. 
The Current Study 
 
The goal of the current study is to take the first steps at understanding the 
legal and illegal work overlap by placing this phenomenon as a key subject of 
inquiry. Because the phenomenon has yet to be examined systematically, the first step 
is to descriptively document population heterogeneity in patterns of legal and illegal. 
To do this, I estimated group based trajectory models of legal work and illegal work 
and to model their joint evolution, I conducted dual trajectory model analysis. 
Second, I examined whether legal economic opportunities are related to the 
conditional probabilities between legal and illegal work trajectories. Finally, because 
engaging in both legal and illegal work can be differentially related to key criminal 
career parameters, I examined the relationship between engaging in the overlap and 
offending frequency and offending variety. As such, the goal of the present study is to 





1. Are there heterogeneous patterns of legal work and illegal work? What is 
the heterogeneity in joint development of legal and illegal work? 
 
2. How are legal economic opportunities related the probability of 
membership in illegal work, conditional on legal work? 
 
3. How is participation in the legal and illegal work overlap associated with 
offending frequency and offending variety? 
 
To answer these research questions I used the Pathways to Desistance Study, a unique 
dataset from a longitudinal sample of serious adolescent offenders. The Pathways 
study contains detailed measures that are related to participation in legal and illegal 
work, such as demographics, perceived economic opportunities, and local life 
circumstances. Importantly, I observed monthly participation for both legal and 
illegal work over 84 months, which is advantageous for consistent estimation of 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior Conceptualizations of Legal and Illegal Work 
 
Despite the documented prevalence of the legal and illegal overlap, this 
section will demonstrate that most of the prior literature is focused on examining how 
legal work moves offenders away from illegal work. Although the focus of the 
current study is on individual patterns of legal and illegal work, it is important to 
highlight that macro-level studies also view legal work as moving away from illegal 
work.  In his review Bushway (2011) clearly articulated this position by stating that 
the reason why unemployment has a positive effect on illegal work is because it 
increases motivation for individuals who are unemployed.1 Studies examining the 
effects of employment have focused on aggregate crime rates and the role of 
macroeconomic conditions and have revealed small effects of unemployment rates on 
property crime (e.g. Arvanites and Defina, 2006; Bushway, 2011). Empirical findings 
also support the legal and illegal work polarization: Rosenfeld and Fornago (2007) 
measured the relationship between business cycles and crime by examining consumer 
sentiment and property crime and found an inverse relationship. Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer (2001) estimated the effects of unemployment rates and seven felony offenses 
in the United States. They found significant positive effects of unemployment on 
property offenses, but no effects on violent offenses.   
                                                 
1 Cantor and Land (1985) similarly argued that the relationship between employment and crime can 
operate through a motivational effect, where unemployed individuals are motivated to commit crime 
because they are out of work and need to fulfill their financial needs. However, the relationship 
between employment and crime can also operate through routine activities, which predicts that 
individuals who are unemployed are less likely to spend time in public places and therefore less likely 





 On the individual level, the relationship between legal and illegal employment 
is a topic of theoretical debate that revolves around selection mechanisms that explain 
why individuals who are unemployed also commit a disproportionate share of crime 
in the population. Some scholars have argued that legal and illegal employment are 
inversely related due to a reflection of underlying characteristics in the population, 
such as low self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006), and early personal and family factors 
(Caspi et al., 1998), whereas other scholars give a causal role to legal employment. 
Notably, Sampson and Laub (1993) argue that quality work can serve as a turning 
point in a criminal career. The stronger the ties to work, the less likely an individual 
would engage in illegal work. Legal work can serve as structure for one’s routine 
activities and serve as a platform to form or strengthen conventional social bonds. As 
a result, individuals involved in quality legal work would naturally move away from 
illegal work. Alternatively, scholars have argued that cognitive changes occur prior to 
legal employment and legal employment facilitates, sustains and reinforces the 
desistance process (i.e., Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph, 2002; Maruna, 2001; 
Paternoster and Bushway, 2009). The important point to underscore for the purposes 
of the current study is that prior work conceptualizes legal and illegal work as 
separate and rarely coinciding. As such, the focus of extant theoretical dialogue is on 
the causal relationship and temporal ordering of how legal employment moves 
individuals away from illegal work.   
 A potential limitation of prior theoretical work is that the conceptualization of 





is not clear whether the findings described in previous studies effectively capture the 
complex nature of legal and illegal employment.  While the empirical and theoretical 
literature provides important insight into the impact that legal work has on illegal 
work, this picture may be somewhat limited.  For example, Sampson and Laub (1993) 
examined a sample of males born around the Great Depression and followed them 
through 45 years of age. Sampson and Laub’s central thesis is that involvement in 
quality employment generates conventional social capital, which are resources 
embedded in relationships and can bind individuals to societal institutions. They 
clearly convey their stance on the relationship between legal and illegal work by 
stating “We believe that adults, regardless of delinquent background, will be inhibited 
from committing crime to the extent they have social capital invested in their work 
and family lives” (p. 141). In a follow-up qualitative analysis, Laub and Sampson 
(2003: 46) remain consistent with their position stating that “strong ties to work can 
lead to desistance from crime”. Despite this conceptualization of the legal and illegal 
work relationship, Laub and Sampson’s (2003) findings unraveled a more complex 
relationship. They found a group of individuals who did not resemble neither 
desisters nor persisters and called them intermittent offenders. Laub and Sampson 
(2003) note that such complexities emerge because of longitudinal data coming from 
multiple sources.  
Giordano and colleagues’ (2002) theory of cognitive transformation is another 
example of how theories of desistance can be dampened by exclusively focusing on 
how legal work moves offenders away from illegal work. Giordano et al.’s (2002) 





Giordano et al. (2002), cognitive change is required before desistance can occur. To 
examine their theory, they conducted interviews with 127 institutionalized delinquent 
girls and 127 institutionalized delinquent boys. Their key measures included job 
stability, attachment to spouse, and attachment to children and their outcomes were 
self-reported offending and arrest histories. Quantitative findings showed that the 
effect of job stability on offending was weak, although coupled with marriage in a 
“respectability package”, the effects were stronger. It is unclear in the analysis how 
individuals who reported being involved in both legal and illegal work were 
categorized. Interestingly, Giordano et al. (2002) noted that a majority of the 
respondents in their sample resided in households with total incomes below the 
poverty line and most of those employed also earned under-the-table wages. This 
observation suggests that it is likely that many of the respondents in their sample also 
engaged in legal and illegal work at the same time.  
Recent work by Skardhamar and Savolainen (2014) attempt to disentangle the 
role of employment in offending by looking at the timing of employment in the 
desistance process but also followed in the tradition of polarizing legal and illegal 
work. They examine the occurrence of criminal offending (yes/no) in a given month 
before and after the entry into employment (also as a binary indicator). After 
conducting spline regressions and group based trajectory models to examine the 
timing of entry into employment, they do not find support for the work as a turning 
point hypothesis. Instead Skardhamar and Savolainen (2014) found that illegal work 
declined prior to finding legal work. Yet it is important to note that there are 





limited cross-sectional power. Consistent with prior literature, their conceptualization 
of the legal and illegal work dichotomy is clear in their conclusions. They observed 
that a “typical path to employment involves a period of criminal inactivity lasting two 
years or more…and most individuals experience no meaningful reductions in criminal 
activity after employment” (p.287).   
The concept of intermittency, or the stopping and restarting of one’s criminal 
career (Piquero, 2004), is yet another example of the separation of legal and illegal 
work. Glaser (1964) examined the rehabilitative efforts of prison and parole agencies 
and provided an extensive discussion on variations on post-release trajectories. In 
doing so, Glaser argued that criminal careers almost always follow a zig-zag path. 
That is, criminals go from crime to non-crime. Laub and Sampson (2003) also moved 
beyond persistence and desistance and discussed the intermittent offender. Among the 
sample of Glueck men, Laub and Sampson note that there were intermittent offenders 
who followed a zig-zag pattern of crime over the life course. Laub and Sampson 
(2003) note that the patterns of intermittency are complex but what emerged from the 
life histories is that intermittent offending is often associated with neighborhood 
influences where conventional and criminal influences exist side-by-side. Alcoholism 
was also strongly associated with an erratic pattern of offending. Laub and Sampson 
found that alcoholic men would exhibit inconsistent offending and engage in 
offending during episodes of intoxication. Related to the current study, Laub and 
Sampson’s findings suggest that there are external factors that impact individual 





Although not extensive, treatment of the intermittency of offending is relevant 
here because it departs from the traditional offender/non-offender categories. 
However, intermittency differs from the topic of the current study – contemporaneous 
legal and illegal work – because it explains the breaks or pauses in offending, with the 
break or pauses sometimes being several years long (Baker et al., 2013; Barnett et al., 
1989). For example, Barnett et al. (1989) analyzed data from a sample of London 
males to examine the long-term accuracy of classifying offenders into frequents and 
occasionals (on the offenders’ 25th and 30th birthdays). The authors found that for a 
few of the men, after several years without convictions they were reconvicted. 
Horney et al. (1995) examined month by month variation in crime participation 
among a cohort of felons incarcerated in Nebraska and found that gaps in loss of 
conventional social capital and increased drug use predicted the odds of offending.  
The evidence from labor market experiments also suffer from the conceptual 
rigidity of polarizing legal and illegal work. These studies are concerned with 
assessing the effectiveness of in-prison vocational training programs and work-
release programs for their ability to reduce recidivism rates for ex-prisoners. As such, 
the research is primarily limited to studies assessing whether employment decreases 
the odds of recidivism.  For example, in their meta-analysis of eight studies using 
random assignment experimental designs, Visher et al. (2005) examined the effects of 
non-custodial employment services for ex-offenders in employment programs. 
Outcomes of the eight studies were largely self-reported recidivism and/or arrest. The 
results revealed that the eight interventions had no significant effect on the probability 





been echoed in more recent reviews (i.e. Bushway and Apel, 2012; Crutchfield, 
2014). The generally weak effects of employment programs are perhaps partially due 
to the fact that a considerable number of parolees that get re-arrested are employed at 
the same time. For example Petersilia (2005) has noted that among parolees, 
reconviction and re-incarceration rates are high despite employment generally being a 
provision of the individuals’ parole. Research suggests that the effect of work 
programs on reoffending is conditioned by a number of factors (i.e. Uggen, 2000; 
Uggen and Shannon, 2014). Therefore, understanding the heterogeneity in patterns of 
legal and illegal work and factors that contribute to how the two are linked can shed 
some insight into the effectiveness of employment programs across heterogeneous 
subpopulations of offenders.  
To summarize, the vast majority of theoretical and empirical work on legal 
and illegal work have conceptualized legal work as a catalyst away from illegal work. 
Theoretical dialogue on the role of legal work in the desistance process tends to 
assume that work is positively associated with the desistance process and the area of 
contention is in the timing of legal work within that process. Evaluations of labor 
market experiments have similarly neglected the idea that legal and illegal work can 
occur contemporaneously. This disregard could be a reason why there are relatively 
weak effects of employment programs on recidivism.  
Perspectives That Consider the Legal and Illegal Work Overlap 
 
Two classic examples of literatures that do not polarize legal and illegal work 
are the white collar crime and organized crime literatures. White collar crime and 





Sutherland coined the concept of “white collar crime” to highlight the fact that crimes 
are committed by individuals in all social classes. Sutherland (1949) defined white-
collar crime as “crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status 
in the course of his occupation.” Although Sutherland’s definition has been widely 
criticized due to inconsistency and ambiguity, Sutherland drew attention to both the 
status of the offender and the location of the offense (the workplace). Clinard and 
Quinney (1973) further clarified the concept of white collar crime into two types: 
corporate crime and occupational crime. They focused their definition of corporate 
crime on illegal behaviors that are committed by employees of a corporation to 
benefit the corporation, company, or business. In contrast, they defined occupational 
crime as “violations of legal codes in the course of activity in a legitimate 
occupation.” Since Sutherland and Clinard and Quinney, a number of scholars refined 
the definition of white collar crime, focusing on the offender subtypes and/or offense 
types. Nonetheless, the commonality among extant definitions of white collar crime is 
the emphasis on the importance of offender status and power (Simpson, 2012).  
Similar to white collar crime, there is not a universal definition of organized 
crime. However, unlike white collar crime, organized crime is not always 
characteristic of a legal work and illegal activities. Maltz (1976) for example notes 
that although there are many good reasons for organized crime groups to diversify 
into legitimate businesses, not all criminal organizations have legitimate enterprises 
in addition to their illegitimate enterprises. Nonetheless, it is common for an 
“organization” to not be exclusively involved in illegal market activities and also be 





and the President’s Commission noted that crime organizations use illegitimate 
methods along with legitimate businesses and labor unions to forward their interests 
(Schelling, 1971). According to Hagan (1983) one of the key dimensions of organized 
crime is that criminal organizations have the ability to penetrate legitimate businesses. 
Even though the legal and illegal overlap are inherent in both white collar crime and 
to a lesser extent organized crime, the focus of the current study differs because the 
offenses considered here are characteristic of regular street offenses rather than 
offenses specifically associated with power and status in the workplace or part of an 
organized criminal network.   
In addition to the white-collar and organized crime literatures, two theoretical 
perspectives that move away from offender/non-offender categories are the rational 
choice/economic perspective and Matza’s theory of drift.  
Rational Choice Perspectives 
 
The basic premise of the rational choice perspective is that people, including 
offenders, are rational actors.  The rational choice perspective can be traced back to 
Bentham (1789) and his presentation of human nature. In the introduction to the 
Principles, Bentham argued that humans are governed by two drives – pleasure and 
pain. Pleasure and pain operate through the notion of utility. That is, activities that 
bring pleasure provide utility whereas those that bring pain provide disutility, this is 
also known as the hedonistic calculus. From the rational choice perspective, humans 
will engage in activities that bring the most utility. Prominent scholars who have 
brought the rational choice perspective to the contemporary study of crime are Gary 





A foray into economics of criminal behavior was the work of Becker (1968). 
Becker specifically rejected the idea of motivations for criminal behavior based on 
explanations other than choice and argued that criminal behavior does not need to be 
explained with special theories such as psychological theories or the inheritance of 
special traits. A simple extension of the economist's usual analysis of choice is all that 
is required to explain criminal behavior. Becker re-introduced the notion of expected 
utility. Becker (1968) asserted that a person commits an offense if the expected utility 
to him/her exceeds the utility he/she could get by using his/her time and other 
resources at other activities. Becker noted that in the decision to engage in crime, 
individuals consider the costs and benefits of both crime and non-crime activities. 
Clarke and Cornish (1985) also presented the rational choice perspective as an 
alternative view to other strict dispositional theories and environmental theories. In 
their book, The Reasoning Criminal, Cornish and Clarke (1986) argued that rather 
than general and global explanations, criminological explanations should be more 
crime specific and consider situational factors. Cornish and Clarke also argued that 
the rational choice approach requires a fundamental distinction regarding criminal 
involvement and criminal events. Criminal involvement refers to the process whereby 
individuals choose to become involved, persist in or desist from offending. Criminal 
events on the other hand primarily concern immediate circumstances and situations.  
The rational choice perspective is especially beneficial for understanding the 
legal and illegal work overlap because it assumes that criminal behavior requires no 
special motivation and behavior is a product of the utility of an individual’s actions. 





to incentives just like non-criminals – an individual’s decision to engage in illegal 
work is not qualitatively different from his/her decision to engage in legal work. 
Through this lens, all things being equal, the action with the greatest utility will be 
selected among alternatives. Therefore, the decision to commit crime will be 
influenced by the financial returns it offers in comparison to competing legal 
opportunities, at the margins. Cornish and Clarke’s differentiation between criminal 
involvement and criminal events is also relevant for the current purposes because it 
highlights that factors that affect whether or not an individual participates in illegal 
work generally can differ from the frequency of engaging in illegal work to due to 
situational circumstances. For example, Freeman (1996) observed that depending on 
available opportunities, disadvantaged youth shift back and forth between low-wage 
labor markets and crime, often engaging in both at the same time.  
Time allocation models are an application of the rational choice perspective. 
The objective of time allocation models is to explain how an individual allocates 
his/her time between various activities (Sjoquist, 1973), for instance work and leisure 
in its simplest form. Such as housework Becker (1965), women in the labor market 
(Mincer, 1962), education and training (Becker, 1962) and leisure and home 
production (Gronau, 1977). Extensions of the time allocation model have been made 
to crime.  These models view individuals as deciding to allocate time with illegal 
activity as one possible way to allocate one’s time and participation in each activity is 
associated with gains and costs from each respective activity. Factoring into the 
decision to participate in illegal activity are the expected incentives and expected 





maximize expected utility.  Ehrlich (1973) was among the first economists to 
examine the time allocation model in terms of legal and illegal activity by 
incorporating punishments and rewards for both legal and illegal activities. Ehrlich 
(1975) also presented participation in illegal activities as an occupational choice 
whereby individuals decide how to optimally allocate their resources under 
uncertainty rather than specify each activity as decision between mutually exclusive 
activities. Ehrlich (1975) argued that the decision to engage in illegal activity is not 
inherently an either/or choice. Rather individuals combine various legal and illegal 
activities or switch from one to another throughout their lifetime. To test that 
offenders are in fact incentive based, Ehrlich examined variations in index crimes 
across a number of states in the US in 1940, 1950 and 1960 and found that 
participation in crime was associated with the gains and costs of criminal activity. 
Specifically, Ehrlich found that shifts in legitimate labor-force participation, an 
indicator of time spent in the legitimate market, were inversely related to shifts in 
property offenses.  These results suggest a substitution effect of legal work and illegal 
work.  
Since Ehrlich, a number of economists have also extended time allocation 
models to legal and illegal activities. Heineke (1978), for example, developed a time 
allocation model whereby the allocation of time to legal activities is independent of 
allocation of time to illegal activities but allocating time to illegal activities is 
dependent on legal activities. Schmidt and Witte (1984) developed a more complex 
model of time allocation, which allows for an individual’s level of utility to differ 





allow for leisure time to vary and affect utility, depending on legal or illegal work. 
Notably, Grogger (1998) examined the responsiveness of youth crime to labor market 
incentives. Grogger (1998) utilized data gathered from the 1980 crime section of the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) in a time allocation model of crime 
participation. Grogger (1998) observed that almost everyone in his sample worked in 
the legal labor market and thus “the goal of [his] model should be to explain crime in 
a world in which almost everyone works on the labor market” (p. 759). As such, 
Grogger (1998) assumed that an individual will choose to work if the market wage 
offer exceeds the reservation wage. That is, an individual will choose to commit 
crime if the returns to crime for the first hour of activity exceed the reservation wage. 
There are two primary implications of this assumption. First, consumers choose how 
much time to spend participating in criminal activities and then how much time to 
spend working in the legitimate labor market. Second, the consumer optimizes his 
utility through legal wage offers and criminal returns.  Grogger found that an increase 
in the legal wages reduced the crime participation rate, suggesting that young men are 
responsive to wage incentives.  
Time allocation models are helpful in examining the legal and illegal overlap 
because they conceptualize crime as a form of work. For example, Grogger (1998: 
758) noted, “consumers decide how much crime to commit and how much to work on 
the market as a function of their returns to crime…an hour spent committing crime 
causes no more disutility than an hour spent working.”  Time allocation models also 
place both legal and illegal work into one model, and generally examines how 





each activity. Despite this, time allocation models of legal and illegal work have not 
gained much traction in criminological discourse for several reasons. First, as 
previously mentioned, there has been little theoretical and even less empirical 
attention devoted to examining the legal and illegal overlap. Models directly 
accounting for the possibility that individuals can be engaged in both legal and illegal 
work simultaneously would not be at the center of inquiry if the focus of the 
criminological discourse has been on explaining differences between offenders and 
non-offenders. Second, unlike models that explore consumer’s allocation of time, 
usually between work, leisure and home production (i.e. Gronau, 1977), development 
of time allocation models of legal and illegal work have been hindered by lack of 
data.  Much of the empirical research conducted on the economics of crime has 
utilized data from the NLSY 1979. However, there are drawbacks to the NLSY. The 
1979 NLSY contained a special module that asked respondents whether they 
committed specific types of crimes during 1979 and how much of their income was 
derived from crime. However, the illegal income based measure is crude – 
respondents were asked what fraction of their income came from crime (none, very 
little, about one fourth, about one-half, about three-fourths, or almost all). Further, the 
NLSY does not contain information regarding the number of hours spent engaged in 
illegal work or attitudes towards risk.   
Delinquency and Drift 
 
Matza (1964) is arguably the most notable scholar who devoted much of his 
time to refuting the traditional delinquent/non-delinquent distinction. The primary 





delinquent. Positivists negated the notion of free-will and criminal behavior took the 
form of hard determinism. Matza (1964) believed that delinquency was not pre-
determined by radically different constitutional, personal, or socio-cultural factors, 
but rather “men vacillate between choice and constraint… most men, including 
delinquents are neither wholly free nor completely constrained but fall somewhere in 
between” (p.8:27). Instead, Matza (1964) observed that the nature of delinquency was 
not permanent but rather intermittent and transient. Delinquents are both capable and 
involved in conventional roles and activities who are intermittently involved in 
delinquency. According to Matza (1964), most individuals are distracted or restrained 
by convention from committing offenses. However, episodically, he/she is free to 
drift into delinquency. While the state of drift is not a sufficient condition for 
delinquency, it is a necessary one. Once in drift, individuals have free will and are 
likely to choose delinquency due to subcultural influences. To be sure, during most of 
a delinquent’s life, and for almost all of the lives of more conventional youth, he/she 
may not choose to commit an offense. But when an offense does occur, Matza’s 
drifting delinquents use learned neutralization techniques, which makes the offense 
morally tenable. To make the offense possible, they rely on past criminal experiences 
(preparation) or are found in extenuating circumstances, which simultaneously 
releases moral constraints and prompts individuals to gravitate towards delinquent 
peers.   
Matza’s theory of drift is helpful in understanding the legal and illegal work 
overlap for several reasons. First, Matza (1964) argued that holding onto rigid 





may be observed in the empirical world and can result in losing what is essential in 
the character of the delinquent enterprise. Although, Matza was referring to the 
positivist school assumptions, this statement suggests that theoretical assumptions, in 
general, can serve as blinders to observed empirical realities. In the current context, 
engaging in legal and illegal work contemporaneously is a well-documented 
phenomenon but is not conducive to certain theoretical assumptions. Second, Matza 
discussed the intertwined nature of conventional and unconventional traditions or 
cultures.  He argued that a “subculture of delinquency stands between convention and 
crime, committed to neither, influenced by both….the subculture of delinquency itself 
is a synthesis between convention and crime and that the behavior of many juveniles, 
some more than others, is influenced but not constrained by it” (p. 48). This portrayal 
of the overlap between conventional and deviant subcultures lays the groundwork for 
the idea that values and customs do not have to be solely conventional or deviant – it 
is possible for individuals to hold both.  Finally, Matza placed emphasis on 
intermittency of delinquency, but has also made reference to the simultaneity of 
conventional and unconventional activity.  For example he stated “Concomitant with 
his illegal involvement, he actively participates in a wide variety of conventional 
activity…he is committed to neither delinquent nor conventional enterprise” (p.28). 
Although Matza’s theory is often evoked to describe intermittent/zig-zag offending 
(i.e. Laub and Sampson, 2003; Piquero, 2004), it is clear that his theory is relevant for 









Contemporaneous participation in legal and illegal work has also been 
depicted in number of ethnographic works.  These ethnographic works provide an in-
depth look at communities where the lines between legal and illegal work is blurred. 
They also provide insight into the mechanisms that allow individuals to be involved 
with both legal and illegal work. While there are several notable works that shed light 
into the legal and illegal work overlap, two prominent pieces are Whyte’s Street 
Corner Society (1943) and Sullivan’s (1989) Getting Paid.  
Whyte’s (1943) work is especially useful because it depicts the community of 
Cornerville, an Italian slum, which upon first glance can be classified as socially 
disorganized. However Whyte observed that what appears to be disorganized can be a 
form of differential social organization, which is in fact highly organized and 
integrated. There are two types of young men in Cornerville: the cornerboys and the 
college boys. The corner boys congregate on the corners and street and make up the 
majority of the lower end of the community whereas the college boys are a small 
group of boys with promising upward mobility attained through education. The 
influential individuals in Cornerville however are the racketeers and politicians. 
Illegal gambling and bootleg liquor outlets were highly organized and meshed with 
the legal businesses in the community. Whyte (1943) noted that many of the rackets 
in the community invested in a “large number of legitimate enterprises…from the 
racketeer’s standpoint there are several advantages to having legitimate business 
interests...The racket functions in Cornerville as legitimate businesses function 





to gain respectability so that he may become accepted by society at large as he is 
accepted in Cornerville” (p. 146). Many of the cornerboys aspired to become 
involved with the rackets and often referred to their low-level involvement as work. 
For example, Whyte observed that the racketeers perform the important function of 
providing employment for a large number of men, in all their activities – legal or 
illegal.  
  In Getting Paid, Sullivan (1989) placed greater emphasis on structural 
constraints than Whyte. Sullivan (1989) was dissatisfied with traditional explanations 
of criminal behavior, which includes biological, psychological, and subcultural. 
Sullivan emphasized the economic aspects of criminal behavior. Sullivan’s work 
revealed that many young men face restricted economic opportunities and look to 
crime as a way of “getting paid”. The semantics of “getting paid” demonstrates that 
these young men view crime as a means of work. Further, many of the men are very 
conscious and deliberate in their actions regarding what kind of activities they engage 
in. Sullivan (1989) developed an interactionist approach to crime whereby values are 
embedded in community contexts (which do not differ dramatically from the wider 
society but are more specific to local life circumstances). For Sullivan, structure and 
context mixes with individual diversity and human agency.  
Sullivan (1989) conducted a comparative ethnography of three neighborhoods 
in Brooklyn, New York: BaBarriada, Projectville and Hamilton Park and applied 
segmented labor market theory to inform the portrayal of the different career paths 
within each of the neighborhoods. Segmented labor market theory suggests that there 





employment and secondary, which includes low-wage jobs, informal work, and 
crime. Activities in the secondary market must be alternated as none of the activities 
alone are sufficient to make a living. Sullivan noted that the seriousness of criminal 
activity was dependent on the availability of access to local opportunities. For 
neighborhoods like LaBarriada and Projectville, where the opportunities were limited, 
drug dealing was a career for youth and adults alike. However in Hamilton Park, a 
predominately white neighborhood, where there was access to legal jobs for most of 
the youths, drug dealing was a way to supplement legal wages.  Similar descriptions 
to Sullivan’s have been offered among various ethnic groups, in different cities. For 
example, among inner city males in Philadelphia (Anderson, 1999), Puerto Rican 
youth in Chicago (Padilla, 1992), and youth in Manhattan (Fagan, 1992).  
Ethnographic studies have implications for the current study because they 
move beyond individual level factors and point to the fact that economic structural 
constraints can allow individuals to view crime as a valid form of work. The choice 
between legal and illegal work is partially dependent on opportunities and are 
interchangeable. That is, youth who have structural constraints readily shift between 
legal and illegal work making the elasticity of the supply of crime high. Moreover, 
the notion of constrained choice is underscored in these ethnographic accounts of 
inner city youth. Fagan (1992) for example discusses how youth involved with drug 
dealers can have further incentive to have a legal job. Factors such as expanding 
social capital (both conventional and criminal), building human capital, and investing 





 In general, theoretical and empirical literature tend to polarize involvement in 
legal and illegal work. Specifically, legal work is conceptualized as a factor that helps 
individuals move away from illegal work. Empirical observations however show that 
the relationship between legal and illegal work is much more complex. In line with 
Sviridoff and Thompson’s (1983) observations over thirty years ago, a good number 
of individuals engage in legal and illegal work concurrently. Examining the complex 
nature of legal and illegal work can potentially be fruitful for expanding the 
understanding of the nature of crime in general and could potentially inform help with 
understanding of the effectiveness of employment programs. 
Research Question One: What We Know about the Legal and Illegal Work 
Overlap 
 
Although a number of scholars noted that it is not uncommon for legal and 
illegal work to coincide (e.g. Fagan, 1992; Freeman, 1999; Reuter et al., 1990), 
discussions of the legal and illegal work overlap are limited in scope and usually arise 
from secondary findings and not from the main research questions. Previous studies 
provide valuable aggregate rates of prevalence of involvement in both legal and 
illegal work but they tend to be within smaller samples, such as snowball drug 
dealing samples. Given that involvement in both legal and illegal work is fairly 
common and has important consequences for contemporaneous involvement, detailed 
and systematic inquiry into the legal and illegal work overlap is essential. 
Freeman (1999: 3543) examined employment and criminal activity among 
disadvantaged youths in the 1980s and observed that the majority of individuals who 
participate in the illegal sector simultaneously derive income from legitimate jobs and 





the various ways that legal and illegal work can overlap: “The border between illegal 
and legal work is porous, not sharp. Some persons commit crimes while employed – 
doubling up their legal and illegal work. Some persons use their legal jobs to succeed 
in crime. Some criminals shift between crime and work over time, depending on 
opportunities.” Some young people may view criminal activities as an attractive 
alternative to legitimate labor market opportunities. These youth may consider all 
available economic opportunities, both legal and illegal, in the labor market. In a 
sense, they are entrepreneurs, choosing the combination of criminal and legitimate 
activities that produces the highest expected utility, accounting for the possibility of 
arrest and incarceration and the social stigma associated with crime.  
Witte and Witt (2000) discussed traditional economic models and similarly 
noted that the dichotomy between either criminal activity or legal activity is an 
oversimplification. They also recognize that individuals could engage in criminal 
activities while employed since legal work can provide have greater opportunities to 
commit crime.  Some offenders may choose to supplement work income with crime 
income in order to satisfy their needs. They go on to further argue “one problem with 
most work and crime models is that they assume both activities are mutually 
exclusive. This may be a problematic assumption when considering disadvantaged 
youth. The fact that a youth can shift from crime to an unskilled job and back again or 
can commit crime while holding a legal job means that the supply of youths to crime 
will be quite elastic with respect to relative rewards from crime vis a vis legal work or 
to the number of criminal opportunities” (p. 11). Horney et al. (1995) examined short-





employment, drug use and marriage. Using a sample of incarcerated male felons from 
the Nebraska Department of Corrections, they found that surprisingly, the odds of 
committing a property crime increased by 28% in the months when men worked. 
They rationalized their findings by stating that legal employment can potentially 
provide increased opportunities to commit property crimes such as theft, forgery or 
fraud in the workplace.  
Correctional scholars have also documented that there is a substantial legal 
and illegal work overlap. Lynch and Sabol (2001) looked at the characteristics of the 
prison re-entry population and noted that two-thirds of the offenders were employed 
prior to prison entry. Recently, LaVigne (2014) noted that many offenders had 
employment before they were incarcerated and upon release, offenders actively want 
and seek legal employment. Beyond obtaining employment, which many eventually 
do (Western, 2002); job retention is a key factor in the desistance process. LaVigne 
(2014) argued that policy makers acknowledge that the vast majority of offenders do 
not pursue illegal activities on a full-time basis; most hold down some form of legal 
employment. One reason for returning to crime after incarceration is that former 
prisoners earn relatively low wages and supplement their income with illegal work. 
LaVigne (2014) noted that parolees who earned less than $7 per hour were twice as 
likely to return to prison compared to those who earned more than $10 an hour. Work 
is likely to be a key element of most effective reentry programs, but expanding the 
types of inquiry regarding the precise nature of work in desistance is required to 
identify its role in the desistance process. Given the obstacles to finding stable 





in a mix of legal and illegal activities (Piehl, 2003). Therefore, even though work 
programs appear to be effective for some individuals, continuation of illegal work 
may be a reality.  
In addition to scholars discussing the legal and illegal overlap, there have been 
empirical observations, across various samples, that show legal and illegal work often 
take place during the same period.  Table 1 summarizes the literature that has 
documented the phenomenon of engaging in both legal and illegal work 
contemporaneously. Two striking results emerge from Table 1. First, the prevalence 
of the legal and illegal overlap is non-negligible. Approximately 20% of the samples 
across the studies were involved in both legal and illegal work. Second, there is 
remarkable consistency across studies regarding the prevalence of the legal and 
illegal work overlap. Using data from the National Supported Work Demonstration 
Project, which consists of ex-addicts, ex-offenders, and young school dropouts, 
Thompson and Uggen (2010) reported that approximately 27% of the sample reported 
receiving earnings from a combination of legal and illegal income. Viscusi (1986) 
found that 24% of inner-city youths who reported engaging in criminal behavior also 
had legal jobs. Similarly, Fagan (1992) looked at the legal and illegal monthly income 
of inner city youth from two neighborhoods in New York. In addition to income from 
illicit activities, approximately 25% of the youth in his sample earned money from 
formal sources. Reuter and colleagues’ (1990) findings that about 60% of the drug 
dealers in their sample reported working fulltime and selling drugs is much higher 
than what is reported in the other studies. One possible reason is that Reuter’s sample 





adolescent or young adult samples in the other studies. These studies provide 
important accounts of the prevalence of individuals who engage in legal and illegal 
work, and demonstrate that participation in legal and illegal work is not uncommon. 
Curiously however, no study to date has focused on systematically examining the 





Table 1. Prevalence of Contemporaneous Legal and Illegal Work  
 
 
Study Data source 
 
Sample Measures Findings 
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61 adult males 
incarcerated at 
Riker’s Island  
Qualitative reports 
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2,358 Black youth 
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Washington, DC 
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Washington 
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1,134 males (17 to 
23 years old) 




worked in 1979 
Earned any 
income from 
crime in 1979? 
 
 














from legal job and 
earned income 
from illegal work 





This section provided a summary of work that has recognized that legal and 
illegal work do indeed overlap. Even though some scholars argue that looking at legal 
work as a transition away from crime is an oversimplification and have provided 
commentary on the various ways that legal and illegal work can overlap, knowledge 
is limited to aggregate prevalence rates. The current study moves beyond aggregate 
prevalence rates to answer the first research question by explicitly considering 
heterogeneity in participation in legal and illegal work. 
Research Question Two: Legal Economic Opportunities and Participation in 
Legal and Illegal Work  
 
Participation in legal work and participation in illegal work are central 
processes within young offenders’ entry into adulthood. Entry into illegal work as a 
consequence of limited legal economic opportunities has been well established (i.e. 
Crutchfield and Pitchford, 1997; Edelman, Holtzer and Offner, 2006; Sullivan, 1989). 
According to Crutchfield and Pitchford (1997: 93), “the pattern of one’s employment 
or lack of employment influences the degree to one’s criminal involvement”.  For 
example, they argue that marginal employment or transitory employment can in fact 
facilitate criminal opportunities.  The prior research question focused on documenting 
the heterogeneous patterns of legal and illegal work, which involved estimating the 
trajectories of legal and illegal work, allowing for both patterns to change over time.  
Additionally research question one examined the interrelationship between legal and 
illegal work with dual trajectory analysis, which provides conditional and joint 
probabilities of membership between the legal work groups and illegal work groups. 





the conditional probabilities between the legal and illegal work groups established in 
research question one.  
Reduced legal economic opportunities have consistently been cited as a key 
correlate of engaging in illegal work.  Ethnographic work elucidates the idea that 
individuals engage in illegal work because of the structural constraints, such as 
neighborhood deprivation and blocked legal opportunities. Sullivan (1989) for 
example draws attention to the secondary labor market which is characteristic of low-
wage jobs, informal work, and crime. Sullivan (1989) observes that engaging in 
criminal activity was dependent on the availability of access to local legal 
opportunities. These structural constraints are associated with a form of adaptation 
which allows individuals to view crime as a valid form of work. Thus, legal and 
illegal work tends to be interchangeable, depending mainly on opportunities that are 
available. Horowitz (1983) studied Chicanos residing in an impoverished Chicago 
community. She found that even though members of the community value 
involvement in legal work, many of them remain engaged in illegal work. This is 
because there are few good opportunities so it is acceptable to be involved in illegal 
activities to supplement legal wages. The young men in Horowitz’s study hedge their 
bets for future success by remaining in illegal work, regardless of their legal work 
status. Thus, the lack of legal opportunities in one’s neighborhood should be 
associated with a higher probability of membership in a relatively high illegal group.  
The strain perspective has historically focused on the role of blocked legal 
economic opportunities in acquisitive crimes and is therefore important to the current 





argues that society is separated into two parts: structure and culture. The culture of 
American society is centered on monetary wealth yet society is structured in a way 
that does not allow the same opportunities for all individuals to achieve monetary 
wealth, especially in the lower levels of the social structure.  The disjunction between 
the emphasis on monetary success and the limited opportunity structure causes 
society to be anomic. More specifically, Merton hypothesized that the disjunction 
between expectations and aspirations propel individuals into deviance. Cloward and 
Ohlin (1960) are perhaps the most direct in their discussion of how blocked access to 
legitimate opportunities varies across communities, and how this blockage increases 
the likelihood of antisocial activities. General strain theory broadened the scope and 
posited that strains, events or conditions disliked by individuals, is a psycho-social 
phenomenon that stems from various sources, including economic strain (Agnew, 
2006).  
A number of studies demonstrate that economic dissatisfaction is associated 
with income generating crime. For example, Cernkovich and colleagues (2000) found 
that among Whites, dissatisfaction with one’s economic situation and unemployment 
was associated with a higher likelihood of engaging in economic crimes. Recently 
Rebellon et al. (2009) conducted a randomized experiment with college students to 
examine the relationship between economic strain and likelihood of theft. The authors 
found that individuals who experienced a disjunction between expected and actual 
outcomes experienced negative emotionality (anger) and reported a significantly 





The anomie tradition is particularly relevant for the current study. Merton 
(1968) underscores the notion of relative deprivation, which can be thought of as 
people’s perceptions of their well-being relative to comparable others. That is, 
reference groups most commonly come from the same social groups and individuals 
that a person has direct social interaction with. For Merton, it is insufficient to 
examine objective factors such as poverty or inequality, and instead we must try to 
consider the factors that regulate the relationship between objective and subjective 
status.  Agnew et al. (1996) suggests that “dissatisfaction or strain may occur at all 
class levels, and [this] may help to explain the weak effect of stratification measures 
on crime. Agnew argues that “Although one’s ‘objective’ position in the stratification 
system is important, one’s subjective interpretation of that position may be even more 
important” (p. 695). As such, pecuniary success affects individuals in all social strata, 
from the well-to-do to the impoverished. This underscores two important points. First, 
perceptions of legitimate opportunities and the expectations/aspirations gap are 
subjective measures that should be more relevant to membership in illegal work, 
rather than objective deprivation. Second, the expectations/aspirations gap should be 
positively related to illegal work regardless of one’s legal work status.    
Second, an individual’s legal work status is important to consider when 
examining the economic expectations/aspirations gap and instrumental offending.   
Although Merton (1938; 1968) focuses on economic crimes in the lower class, he 
acknowledges that innovation exists even at the top of the economic levels. He cites 
American robber barons, who were at the top of American social strata but 





respectable middle-class individuals who commonly engaged in “off the record 
crimes”.  It is important that legal work should be considered when estimating the 
probability of engaging in illegal work because both legal and illegal work present a 
means to the goal of economic success and can be substitutes or complements to 
achieving the “American Dream”. In fact, previous studies show that engaging in 
both legal and illegal work results in greater income than participating exclusively in 
legal or illegal work.  Reuter et al. (1990) also found that drug dealers who were also 
working a legal job made more than those who were only dealing and recently 
Thompson and Uggen (2012) found that offenders who engaged in both legal and 
illegal work earned more money than those who worked only legally or only illegally. 
When individuals begin to innovate, they use the most expedient means, including 
crime, to pursue goals. 
Only a few studies have considered strain in instrumental offending and have 
accounted for legal employment but the measures of legal employment were not very 
detailed.   Burton et al. (1994) examined the relationship between the 
expectations/aspirations gap, perceptions of blocked economic opportunities and 
relative deprivation and self-reported instrumental offending among adults. Results 
suggest that blocked economic opportunities, relative deprivation significantly 
predicted adult instrumental offending. They account for annual household income 
and it did not surface as significant. Baron (2004) also used relative deprivation as 
predictors of strain: the level of respondents’ satisfaction/dissatisfaction with their 
monetary status and respondents’ to give an overall ranking of themselves relative to 





property crime, while the second more inclusive operationalization predicted property 
and violent crime. The study controlled for unemployment but it was not significantly 
related to the outcomes.     
The current study examines the disjunction between economic expectations 
and economic aspirations as an indicator of legal economic opportunities and a 
blockage of legitimate goals.  It is expected that the greater the disjunction between 
economic expectations and economic aspirations will be associated with a greater 
probability of membership in a higher illegal work compared with lower illegal work 
groups. Horowitz (1983: 160-164) discusses the notion of the American dream in an 
inner city Chicago neighborhood:  
“The acceptance of hard work is consistent with both the American 
dream and the honor code. For the former hard work is instrumental to 
success; for the latter it is critical so that a man can support his family 
in order to retain his authority and respect of others…working a 
traditional job is viewed as the correct means to earn a living. Some 
people use illegal means to supplement income and, while not 
considered the proper means to obtain a living, they are often regarded 
as ethically neutral, that is, situationally adaptive.” 
The quote above suggests that even though an individual subscribes to the 
conventional means of obtaining the American dream, blocked opportunities can 
increase the probability of engaging in illegal work in addition to legal employment 
and therefore both should be considered when assessing the relationship between 
legal economic opportunities and illegal work.  
  To be clear, research question two is not a test of anomie/strain theory but 
rather is guided by the idea, originally forwarded by Merton (1968), that the 
economic “expectations and aspirations” gap is associated with greater probability of 





economic expectations and aspirations should be related to the probability of 
belonging to a group with a high probability of engaging in illegal work conditioning 
on legal group membership. Put another way, the relationship between legal and 
illegal work should be conditioned by legal economic opportunities, which is 
operationalized in three ways: neighborhood conditions, perceived legal opportunities 
and the disjunction between economic expectations and aspirations.  
Although emphasizing legal economic opportunities, I also acknowledge other 
factors might be important to account for when considering the relationship between 
legal and illegal work. For example, individual level factors such as impulse control 
and future orientation are also likely be associated with the conditional probabilities 
of legal and illegal work. Impulse control is a personality trait often associated with 
risk taking and can provide additional incentives to illegal work besides monetary 
returns (e.g., Katz, 1988; Wood et al., 1997). Further, individuals who are low in 
impulse control tend to have “hesitation over risky monetary prospects even when 
they involve an expected gain” (Rabin and Thaler, 2001: 219).  Research on risk 
aversion suggests that individuals who are adverse to thrill or risk are less likely to 
embark on activities that are less certain (Holt and Laudry, 2002; Lattimore and 
Witte, 1989). There are few activities that are inherently more risky than illegal work. 
McCarthy and Hagan (2001) examined a sample of homeless youth and found that 
risk preferences were associated with income from drug selling. Risk-adverse youth 
made the least amount of income from drug selling.  
Future orientation can also play an important role with different pathways to 





describe the ability of an individual to think about, plan for and have control over 
future circumstances (Steinberg et al., 2009). Studies investigating individual 
differences in future orientation suggests that individuals who have weaker 
orientation to the future tend to engage in more risky and delinquent activities 
(Cauffman et al., 2005; Robbins and Bryan, 2004; Steinberg et al., 2009). While more 
risky, the payoffs to illegal work are likely to be more immediate and lucrative 
compared to the legal work that many offenders have. Thus although the illegal 
incentives are lucrative or structural impediments are present, individuals who are 
risk adverse are less likely to be involved with illegal markets. Conversely, 
individuals with weak future orientations may not need strong illegal incentives to 
engage in illegal work in addition to legal work.   
Early offending onset is associated with longer and more prolific offending 
careers (LeBlanc and Frechette, 1989; Moffitt, 1993). Early offending onset is also 
associated with early contact with the criminal justice system (Delisi, 2006), making 
it difficult to obtain legal employment. Early onset is also associated with a host of 
analogous antisocial behaviors, making it more difficult to retain legal employment. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that early onset would reduce the probability of 
being in a stable legal employment trajectory.   
 Fatherhood is a transition that many men experience as transformative (Laub 
and Sampson, 2003). On one hand, parenthood may reduce criminal behavior by 
increasing pressure for social conformity, such as for employment and provision of 
adequate housing and care for the child. For example, Kerr et al. (2011) find that 





Recently, Yule, Pare and Gartner (2014) interviewed incarcerated women about their 
criminal activities post motherhood and found having children reduces women’s 
involvement in criminal activities. On the other hand, children can create an 
imperative for financial resources that some individuals cannot accommodate legally.  
In this situation, parents may be inclined to engage in illegal work to supplement their 
legal income. In their analysis of 566 women from the Toledo Adolescent 
Relationships Study, Giordano et al. (2011) find that the effect of motherhood on 
offending is conditioned by socio-economic status and cognitive factors. For example 
they show that more highly disadvantaged young women are less likely to reduce 
their criminal behavior after becoming parents than are more advantaged young 
women.  
 Parental social position is highly correlated with an individual’s well-being 
and own socioeconomic standing (Huurre, Aro and Rahkonen, 2003). There are a 
variety of mechanisms linking socio-economic status to child well-being. Most 
applicable to the current study is high parental socio-economic status can provide 
individuals with a number of resources and assets such as social capital (resources 
achieved through social connections) (Burt, 1997) and financial capital (Bradley and 
Corwyn, 2002). Therefore, young individuals who have higher parental social status 
tend to have better economic opportunities and less likely to resort to illegal work to 
supplement their legal wages.  
 In sum, past research suggests that legal economic opportunities play an 
important role in why individuals look to illegal work in addition to legal work. For 





factors and blocked legal opportunities can push individuals to engage in illegal work, 
despite already having legal work.  Research question two examines the relationship 
between legal work and illegal work by considering whether or not legal economic 
opportunities condition the conditional probabilities between legal work and illegal 
work. In addition to legal economic opportunities, I recognize that other factors can 
impact the relationship between legal and illegal work patterns. For example, an 
individual’s social bonds to children or individual factors such as age of onset, 
impulsivity or future orientation can all be related to the conditional probabilities of 
legal and illegal work.  
Research Question Three: The Legal and Illegal Overlap and Offending 
Frequency and Offending Variety 
 
 Embarking on different pathways with respect to legal and illegal work may 
also have unique contributions to patterns of stability and change of offending over 
time. The criminal career perspective is uniquely well suited to examine the outcomes 
of the legal and illegal overlap. The suitability of a criminal career perspective is 
exemplified by Blumstein, Cohen and Hsieh (1982: 5) who stated the criminal career 
perspective “does not imply that offenders necessarily derive their livelihood 
exclusively or even predominately from crime; instead, the concept is intended only 
as a means of structuring the longitudinal sequence of criminal events associated with 
an individual in a systematic way.” Key criminal career dimensions include initiation 
(onset), continuation (persistence), frequency of offending, crime type mix 
(escalation, offending variety), and the cessation of the behavior (desistance) 
(Piquero, Farrington and Blumstein 2003). Research question three examines the 





particular, frequency of offending and offending variety will be examined. Looking at 
the quantitative (frequency) and the qualitative (variety) nature of offending can offer 
insight into if and how participation in the legal and illegal overlap is different from 
participation in illegal work only. Such initial insights are important for situating the 
legal/illegal overlap within the criminal career. 
Frequency of Offending 
The frequency of offending of individuals who are engaged in crime often is 
referred to as a rate, λ (Blumstein et al, 1986). Since Wolfgang et al.’s (1972) seminal 
study that found that a small proportion of offenders commit the vast majority of 
crimes, frequency of offending is one of the key dimensions in the criminal career 
because of its methodological and policy implications. A number of earlier studies 
focused on using of self-reports to estimate λ for adult offenders (i.e. Chaiken and 
Chaiken, 1982; Greenwood, 1982; Horney and Marshall, 1991) and have similarly 
found that a small number of offenders are responsible for a disproportionate number 
of crimes. Identification of high-rate offenders is of great interest to policy makers – 
by identifying and selectively incapacitating these high-rate offenders, scarce 
resources can be used more efficiently (Horney and Marshall, 1991). Further, 
estimating the number of crimes that would be prevented if an offender was 
incapacitated is a key concern for cost-benefit analyses of incarcerating offenders.  
Examining the relationship between frequency of offending and the legal and 
illegal overlap is important because theoretically, it is not clear whether participating 
in legal and illegal work is associated with a lower offending rate than engaging in 





step in the desistance process. Laub, Nagin, and Sampson (1998) observed that, 
desistance is a gradual and cumulative process. Although they spoke of the effect of a 
good marriage on crime, their comments are applicable to legal employment. They 
note that the effect of a good marriage takes time to appear and slowly inhibit 
offending. Nagin and Paternoster (1994) had a similar argument.  They argued that 
the strengthening of social bonds develops over time and is akin to the process of 
investment whereby small increments to the bond gradually accumulate to transform 
a once fragile bond to a strong bond. More recently, Van Der Geest et al. (2011) 
examined the relationship between employment and the development of criminal 
careers in a sample of Dutch high-risk males. They found that among adolescent 
limited offenders, there was an association between being employed and reduced 
offending. That is, there were gradual and long-term effects of legal employment. In 
this way, legal work would shift offenders away from illegal work but the effects will 
be gradual and there would still be observations of engaging in illegal work.  
 On the other hand, legal employment can provide further opportunities for 
illegal work. It is possible that legal employment complements illegal work. For 
example, Reuter et al. (1990) observed that drug dealers who sold frequently were 
more likely to hold a legal job compared to occasional sellers, suggesting that legal 
work and drug selling are complements to one another. Similarly, Mars and Gerald 
(1982) examine individuals in various trades who use their positions for illegal gain. 
They argue that for some individuals, the alternative economy is too large and 
lucrative to ignore and it makes more sense from an economic perspective to engage 





legal work facilitates offending and therefore the relationship between engaging in 
the legal/illegal overlap and offending frequency should be positive.     
 With regard to policy, considering offending frequency has a direct 
relationship to resource implications. The most recent recidivism patterns show that 
within three years of release, approximately three quarters of prisoners are rearrested 
and about half of prisoners are incarcerated because of a new crime for which they 
received another prison sentence, or because of a technical violation of their parole 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014). However, correctional scholars have observed 
that (LaVigne, 2014; Lynch and Sabol, 2003) that it is unlikely that many offenders 
who are arrested, are solely engaged in criminal activities – it is likely to have legal 
employment at the time of arrest. Therefore, research into the frequency of offending 
and the overlap between legal and illegal work can provide valuable information 
regarding the appropriate response to offenders who are rearrested.  
Offending Variety 
Blumstein et al. (1988) noted that inquiry into the qualitative nature of 
offending is an important empirical question. They argued that the extent to which 
offenders display specialization or versatility in crime types and the extent offenders 
escalate in the seriousness of their offending has important theoretical and policy 
implications. Theoretically, investigation into offending variety can be informative 
since some of the seminal theories in the field of criminology make specific 
predictions about the extent to which specialization exists (i.e. Gottfredson and 





nature of offending can also inform policies surrounding incarceration and 
correctional treatment (Sullivan et al., 2006).    
In general, findings from criminal career research suggest that there is some 
evidence of specialization and ample evidence of versatility in offending (Bursik, 
1980; Chaiken and Chaiken 1982; Piquero et al. 2007; Wolfgang et al. 1972). 
However, with a growth in analytic methods scholars have found a higher degree of 
specialization than was suggested in earlier work (i.e. Osgood and Schreck, 2007; 
Sullivan et al., 2006). More recently research suggests that the tendency towards 
offending versatility is conditioned by a number of factors. For instance, 
specialization varies along with factors like an individual’s age, age of onset and 
offending frequency (Blumstein et al. 1986; Piquero 2000). The relationship between 
age of onset, offending frequency and specialization is an important one because a 
number of developmental criminologists have consistently speculated that offenders 
who have an early age of onset frequent offenders are more likely to be engaged in 
both greater offending frequency and tend to be involved in a diverse array of offense 
types (LeBlanc& Loeber, 1998; Loeber & LeBlanc, 1990; Moffitt, 1993). Empirical 
studies have supported this argument and found that high-rate offenders are more 
likely to engage in a diverse offending repertoire compared with low-rate offenders 
(i.e. Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Spelman, 1994).  
Scholars have also considered how local life circumstances such as 
employment and marriage relate to offending versatility. Sullivan et al. (2006) found 
that marriage had no relationship with offending versatility. However individuals who 





higher on the diversity index. McGloin et al. (2007) examined local life 
circumstances and the extent to which local life circumstances affect 
specialization/versatility among a sample of incarcerated felons. The authors found 
that marriage was related to less diversity whereas substance use was related to 
increased diversity. They did not find that employment was related to offending 
specialization/versatility. Recently, Jennings et al. (2014) found that among a sample 
of sex-offenders, those who were married were significantly more likely to specialize 
compared with unmarried sex offenders. There were no effects for the participants 
who were employed.   
The current study considers the qualitative nature of offending in two ways. 
First, I examined whether or not engaging in the legal/illegal overlap is associated 
with a greater proportion of instrumental crimes compared to engaging in illegal work 
only. On one hand, if engaging in illegal work concurrently with legal work is a 
rational process, it is reasonable to assume that individuals would only engage in 
instrumental crimes to supplement their income. The material considerations of 
potentially losing one’s job due to an arrest or conviction for a non-instrumental 
offense would weigh heavily on the offending decision (Cornish and Clarke, 1987). 
On the other hand, if the overlap is no different from being involved in illegal work 
only, engaging in illegal work is simply part of a larger offending repertoire. Each of 
these scenarios would require a very different set of responses from criminal justice 
decision makers. The former potentially suggests that illegal work is taken on because 
of financial strains and low legal wages and therefore calls for wage increases in the 





parolees who earned less than $7 per hour were twice as likely to return to prison 
compared to those who earned more than $10 an hour. The latter suggests that 
increases in legal wages may not be a driving factor in reducing the legal and illegal 
work overlap.   
Second, I consider whether or not engaging in both legal and illegal work is 
associated with a greater variety of instrumental crimes. From a network perspective, 
participating in both legal and illegal work can foster both conventional and criminal 
social capital. Extended networks can place individuals in unique positions to forward 
their criminal interests. For example, Morselli et al. (2006) argue that offenders 
require both strong ties and weak ties to be successful. Strong ties are relationships 
that involve larger time commitments whereas weak ties are relationships that require 
little maintenance or commitments (Granovetter, 1973). Engagement in legal work 
can also shift an offender’s routine activities and provide new social ties and 
opportunity structures for engaging in a wider array of instrumental crimes.  
 One of the fundamental functions of criminal career research is to describe 
patterns of criminal offending (Brame, Paternoster and Bushway, 2004).  Systematic 
inquiry into the relationship between the legal/illegal overlap and criminal career 
dimensions is valuable because it sheds light into where the overlap might be situated 
in the criminal career and can reveal differential patterns of criminal offending. For 
example, if the overlap is associated with a gradual reduction in offending frequency, 
this might suggest that the overlap is intermediate step in the desistance process. 
However this process would not be evident if offending is measured in terms of 





CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
The Pathways to Desistance Study 
 
To examine the nature of the legal and illegal overlap and answer my three 
research questions, I use the Pathways to Desistance Study (Mulvey et al., 2004).  
The Pathways to Desistance Study is a longitudinal examination of the transition from 
adolescence to young adulthood in a sample of serious adolescent offenders. The 
adolescents were found guilty of a serious offense (mostly felony offenses) in the 
juvenile or adult court systems in Maricopa County, Arizona or Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania during the recruitment period (November, 2000 through January, 2003). 
The Pathways study captures several important domains of the participants’ lives 
including antisocial behavior, psychological development, and experiences with the 
criminal justice system. Importantly, it is among the few longitudinal studies that 
attempt to capture rich descriptions of each participant's legal and illegal income 
generating activities.  
A total of 1,354 participants were enrolled, and were between the ages of 14 
and 17 years at the time of committing the offense.  The adolescents were selected for 
the study after a review of court documents indicated that they had been found guilty 
of a serious offense, such as felony offenses (Schubert et al., 2004). To ensure that 
there was no overrepresentation of drug offenders, the researchers capped the drug 
offenders at 15% of the sample at each of the sites. Once the adolescents agreed to 
participate in a baseline interview, informed consent was obtained from the juveniles 





approached agreed to enroll in the study (attempted enrollment divided by 
enrollment). The retention rate was 84% at the completion of the study (after 84 
months). 
 The interviews took place in the participants' homes, libraries, other public 
places, or in facilities.  Trained interviewers used computer-assisted interviews and 
read each question to the participant and the respondent entered their answer on a key 
pad. Respondents were encouraged to provide honest answers, and confidentiality 
was assured by confidentiality protections. Data were collected at ten consecutive 
follow-up interviews. The first six interviews correspond to six-month observational 
periods over 36 months and the remaining interviews are twelve-month observational 
periods.  
 In addition to the time point interviews, monthly information regarding 
income-generating activities, employment, self-reported offending, education and 
romantic relationships were collected. The researchers modeled the construction of 
the interviews after the life calendars developed by previous investigators (i.e. Caspi 
et al., 1996; Horney et al., 1995). Researchers for the Pathways study specifically 
asked participants to first recount salient events which occurred in the recall period 
(e.g. birthdays, deaths) and this information remained visible to the participant as an 
anchor point for the timing of events in each of several life calendar domains. This 
approach takes advantage of the research on how to generate accurate accounts of 









Participation in legal work: is a binary variable that indicates that the participant was 
engaged in legal work during the recall period. Legal work is defined as a job where 
an individual receives a paycheck and taxes are withheld. Participants were asked a 
gateway question: Do you currently have a paying job? Have you had a paying job at 
any time over the past N months? The interviewer connected the answers to the 
correct months in the calendar. An affirmative answer was coded as “1” participated 
in legal work for the calendar month.  
 For the purposes of the current study, legal work also included activities in 
which participants were paid under the table. Participants were asked “In the past N 
months, have you earned money where you were paid ‘off the books’ or ‘under the 
table’ or on the ‘DL’ (down low)? By this we mean jobs for which you are paid cash 
and are not reporting this income on tax forms. This could include things like 
cleaning houses and child care”. This was included because it was not until month 60 
and onwards that the Pathways to Desistance study coded under the table activities 
separately.  
Participation in illegal work: Participants were asked “Have you made money in 
other ways over the past N months, including from activities that are illegal?” If the 
respondent answered in the affirmative, the interviewer asked a follow up question: 
“You mentioned that you had made money during the past N months from ways 
besides working.  Did you make any money during this month from activities that are 
illegal?” If the respondent answered in the affirmative again, he/she was asked if they 





selling drugs, stealing merchandise, gambling, prostitution, or other illegal activities 
during the month, then that month will have a value of “1” Yes, and will be “0” No.  
Criminal career measures: 
Instrumental offending rate: Offending rate was calculated by dividing the total 
number of instrumental crimes a participant endorsed by the number of months the 
participant was in the community and  was not in a secure detention facility. The 
instrumental crimes include: 1) entered or broken into a building to steal something, 
2) stolen something from a store, 3) bought, received, or sold something that you 
knew was stolen, 4) used checks or credit cards illegally, 5) stolen a car or motorcycle 
to keep or sell, 6) sold marijuana, 7) sold other illegal drugs (cocaine, crack, heroin), 
8) prostitution, 9) taken something from another by force, using a weapon 10) taken 
something from another by force, without a weapon (Huizinga, Esbensen and Weihar, 
1991). 
Because drug selling can be associated with several transactions a day 
(Jacobs, 1996), it can skew self-reported offending rates. Thus, I included a measure 
of instrumental offending rate, but removed self-reported drug selling (marijuana and 
other illegal drugs) from the list of offenses.  
Offending variety: I use two measures to capture the qualitative nature of offending. 
The first measure is the proportion of instrumental crimes over all crimes. The 
numerator was the count of instrumental crimes endorsed by the respondent (broke in 
to steal, shoplifted, bought/received/sold stolen property, used check/credit card 
illegally, stole car or motorcycle, sold marijuana, sold other drugs, prostitution, took 





denominator was the count of the number of all crimes endorsed by the respondent. 
These include the instrumental crimes in the numerator plus destroyed/damaged 
property, set fire, shot someone and the bullet hit the victim, shot at someone but the 
bullet did not hit the victim, beat up someone which resulted in serious injury, been in 
a fight and beat someone as part of gang.  
The second offending variety measure is the instrumental offending variety 
proportion; a proportion in which the numerator is the number of instrumental 
offenses which were committed and the denominator is the 10 instrumental crimes 
listed above. 
Legal Economic Opportunities: 
There are three main concepts that tap into legal economic opportunities.   
Neighborhood conditions: Neighborhood conditions was included as an indicator of 
legal economic opportunities because scholars frequently note that disorganized 
neighborhoods are high in both unemployment and crime (Rose and Clear, 1998).  
This measure considers the physical and social environment surrounding the 
participant’s home (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). The measure comprises of a 
scale consisting of 21 items to which participants respond on a 4- point Likert scale 
ranging from "Never" to "Often," with higher scores indicating a greater degree of 
disorder within the community. The value is the mean of all 21 items in the scale. The 
higher the value, the greater the disorder. The items on the scale include items that tap 
into physical disorder and social disorder. The physical disorder items included: 
cigarettes on the street or in the gutters, garbage in the streets or on the sidewalk, 





graffiti or tags, graffiti painted over, gang graffiti, abandoned cars, empty lots with 
garbage, condoms on sidewalk, needles or syringes and political messages in graffiti.  
The social disorder items included: gangs (or other teen groups) hanging out, adults 
hanging out on the street, people drinking beer, wine or liquor, people drunk or 
passed out, adults fighting or arguing loudly, prostitutes on the streets, people 
smoking marijuana, people smoking crack and people using needles or syringes to 
take drugs. It is expected that the higher the neighborhood disorganization, the higher 
the probability that participants will belong to a high illegal work group. 
Perceptions of legal opportunities: There are four items that tap into a respondent’s 
perceptions of legal opportunities for legal work in his/her neighborhood (Eccles, 
Wigfield and Schiefele,1998).  The items include: 1) In my neighborhood, it's pretty 
easy for a young person to get a good-paying, honest job 2) In my neighborhood hard 
to make money without doing something illegal 3) Not much opportunity to succeed 
as kids from other neighborhoods 4) Employers around here often hire young people 
from this neighborhood. Perceptions of legal opportunities should be inversely related 
to membership in high illegal work groups.  
Aspirations/expectations: The extent to which economic expectations fall short of 
economic aspirations is used as an indicator of legal economic opportunities. I use 
three items that capture the disjunction between economic expectations and economic 
aspirations: How likely/important to have a good job or career, how likely/important 
to earn a good living and how likely/important to provide a good home for your 
family. In the Pathways study, participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale 





scores for aspirations and expectations indicate greater optimism concerning future 
opportunities and/or success. Lower scores for "expectations fall short" indicate 
greater congruence between these perceptions (Menard and Elliott, 1996). It is 
expected that the greater the disjunction between economic expectations and 
aspirations the higher the probability of membership in a high illegal group. 
Control Variables: 
Gender: I control for gender because males and females have differential patterns of 
participating in the labor market (Altonji and Blank, 1999). The majority of the 
participants were males (87%). 
Site: The extent to which individuals have opportunities to engage in legal work can 
be associated with their locale.  I therefore control for site. Approximately 52% of 
participants resided in Philadelphia and the remainder resided in Phoenix.  
Ethnicity: Ethnicity is commonly an important factor in opportunities for legal 
employment (Western, 2002). Respondents self-reported their ethnicity based on six 
ethnic groups result: White, Black, Asian, Native American, Hispanic, and Other. The 
measure was recoded in four categories: White, Black, Hispanic and Other. 
Age of onset: Age of onset was a self-reported measure of initial participation in 22 
different types of offenses. Individuals were asked "How old were you when you first 
did x?" The average age of first offense was 14.9 years.  
Relationship status: Prior research has suggested that marriage is related to offending 
frequency and specialization (i.e. Laub, Nagin and Sampson, 1998; McGloin et al., 
2006). Because marriage is relatively rare among the participants in this sample, I 





Respondents were asked if he/she was involved in a serious relationship at any point 
over the past N months? These relationships included boyfriend/girlfriend/and 
spouses.  
Children: The relationship between having children and offending is not as clear as 
the relationship between marriage and offending. Some researchers have found that 
attachment to one’s child is negatively associated with offending (Landers et al., 
2014), whereas others found that offending behavior does not decrease after having 
children (Stouthamer-Loeber and Wei, 1998). Respondents were asked to report the 
number of living children in the recall period. Answers ranged from 0 to 4.  
Parental social position: Because parent’s can provide individuals with social capital 
and resources, I account for parental social position. Parental social position was 
based on a formula that took into account parental occupation and parental education 
(Hollingshead, 1971). Higher scores indicate higher social position. 
Peer delinquency: Deviant peers can impact the legal/illegal overlap by providing 
opportunities to commit illegal work (Paternoster, 1989). The respondents were asked 
“During the last six months how many of your friends have engaged in the following 
activity?” The peer delinquency measure is the mean rating of the prevalence of 
friends who engaged in 12 behaviors ranging from damaging property, selling drugs 
to aggravated assault. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
"None of them" to "All of them"? (Thornberry et al., 1994).  
Impulse control: This measure is the mean of 8 items. The items asked participants to 
rank how much (1= False to 5= True) their behavior in the past six months matches a 





think things through before I act, I should try harder to control myself when I’m 
having fun). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of impulse control. 
Future orientation: Future orientation was measured by a mean of 8 items, which is a 
subset of the Future Outlook Inventory developed by Cauffman and Woolard (1999). 
The Future Outlook Inventory asks participants to rank from 1 to 4 (1= Never True to 
4= Always True) the degree to which each statement reflects how they usually are 
(e.g., I will keep working at difficult, boring tasks if I know they will help me get 
ahead later). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of future consideration and 
planning. 
Drug dependency: Heavy drug use can create an impetus to commit instrumental 
crimes (Uggen and Thompson, 2001). Therefore I control for drug dependency, 
which is count of symptoms in the recall period attributed to drug use (i.e. "Have you 
wanted drugs so badly that you could not think of about anything else?") (Chassin, 
Rogosch, Barrera, 1991). If a participant endorsed at least one of the items, he/she 
was coded as being drug dependent.  
Instrumental offending frequency: In addition to being a key outcome in research 
question three, I control for offending frequency when examining the relationship 
between the overlap and offending variety. The mean monthly instrumental offending 
rate was 84.04. Due to skewness, I used the logged monthly instrumental offending 
rate. 
 
Description Statistics of Key Outcomes 
 
Before exploring any potential population heterogeneity (RQ1), the first step 





work, illegal work, and how they overlap. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
demographic breakdown of the participants in the Pathways study, pooled across 
individuals and across 84 months.  Table 2 illustrates that approximately 87% of the 
sample are male.  In terms of ethnicity, 40% are Black, 33% are Hispanic and about 
20% are White. Approximately 52% of the participants were located in Philadelphia 
and the remaining participants were located in Phoenix.   
Table 2. Descriptive information (person-months)  
 
Variable Mean Median Standard  
deviation 
Min, max 
Trajectory outcomes:     
Monthly participation in legal work .380 - - 0, 1 
Monthly participation in illegal work .072 - - 0, 1 
     
Legal only .363 - - 0, 1 
Illegal only .054 - - 0, 1 
Both legal and illegal .018 - - 0, 1 
No work .563 - - 0, 1 
     
     
Demographics:     










































To examine the prevalence of legal and illegal work, four mutually exclusive 
categories were created: legal work only, illegal work only, both legal and illegal 
work, and no work. Here, the units of observation were person-months. On average, 





of engaging in illegal work only and both legal and illegal work was much smaller, 
with approximately 5% and 2% of person-months respectively. 
Figure 1 illustrates the probability of participation in any legal work and any 
illegal work, by age. As expected, the probability of engaging in any legal work 
increased over the course of the study period. However the probability of engaging in 
any illegal work remained relatively consistent over the course of the study period, 
suggesting that these two types of endeavors are not purely substitutes. 
























Figures 2 to 6 show the probability of engaging in any legal work and illegal work 
broken down by gender, site, and race. Figure 2 indicates that at age 18 participation 
in legal work was slightly higher for females (35%) compared to males (30%). 
However male participation rose monotonically over the age profile whereas female 
participation in legal work rose until about age 20 and then slightly declined. Male 
and female participation in illegal work (Figure 3) followed the same declining 
pattern but males participated in illegal money generating activities at a higher 























































   
 
 In terms of site differences, Figure 4 shows that participation in legal work 
was slightly higher in Philadelphia than in Phoenix. Participation in illegal work was 
very similar between participants in Philadelphia and participants in Phoenix at age 
18 but slightly diverged so that participation in illegal work in Philadelphia was 





















































When I examined the racial differences in participation in legal work, results 
showed that at age 18, Whites had over twice the probability of involvement in any 
legal work than Black participants (45% vs. 22%), with Hispanic participants falling 
in between (Figure 6). All three races increased participation in legal work, with the 





illegal work differed greatly across races. Although the probability of engaging in 
illegal work (10%) was the greatest for whites at age 18, Whites had the sharpest 
decline and had the lowest probability of engaging in illegal money generating 
activities by age 24. Blacks also declined over the age profile but only slightly (8% at 
age 18 to 6% by age 24). Interestingly Hispanic participation in illegal work remained 
relatively stable at approximately 6% (Figure 7).  
Figure 6 Monthly Participation in Legal work by Race 
 
 
Figure 7 Monthly Participation in Illegal Work by Race 
 
 
I examined the probability of engaging in both legal and illegal work by 





Figure 8 shows that at age 18, males and females had similar probabilities of 
engaging in the overlap; however males’ cumulative probability increased much more 
rapidly and by age 24, approximately 30% of males engaged in both legal and illegal 
work at least once. In comparison, only about 11% of females self-reported engaging 
in legal and illegal work by the age of 24.  
Figure 8. Cumulative Probability of Engaging in Both by Gender 
 
 
Comparing the cumulative probability of engaging in both legal and illegal 
work between Philadelphia and Phoenix (Figure 9) revealed that there was very little 
difference between the study sites. Figure 10 shows the cumulative probability of 
participating in both across the three race categories. Whites had the highest 
probability of engaging in the overlap across the entire age profile. Hispanic 
participants had the lowest probability of engaging in both legal and illegal work. 
Overall, results suggest that by age 24, approximately 20% of participants earned 





Figure 9 Cumulative Probability of Engaging in Both by Site 
 
 




Table 3 presents the distribution of three mutually exclusive states: legal work 
only, illegal work only and both legal and illegal work and the number of months 





persons. Approximately 20% of participants reported being engaged in the legal and 
illegal overlap at least once and over 6% reported engaging the both legal and illegal 
work 5 or more times during the study period. Participation in illegal work only was 
more common, with 35% of participants engaging in illegal work only during at least 
one month. Conversely, about 84% of engaged in legal work only at least once.  




Both Illegal only Legal only 
 Frequency Cum. % Frequency Cum. % Frequency Cum. % 
0 1,071 79.1 873 64.48 214 15.81 
1 67 84.05 59 68.83 48 19.35 
2 54 88.04 48 72.38 40 22.3 
3 30 90.25 58 76.66 34 24.82 
4 27 92.25 27 78.66 39 27.7 
5 20 93.72 35 81.24 49 31.31 
6 27 95.72 33 83.68 34 33.83 
7 10 96.45 23 85.38 32 36.19 
8 9 97.12 17 86.63 32 38.55 
9 5 97.49 14 87.67 35 41.14 
10 + 34 100 167 100 797 100 
 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, transitions between legal work and 
illegal work is common. Therefore it is important to note that a considerable number 
of participants engaged in both legal work and illegal work, but at different months. 
In fact, 472 of 1320 (35.8%) participants engaged in legal and illegal work at 
different points in the study period. These participants are interesting because their 
patterns of legal and illegal work depart from traditional offender/non-offender 
categories and are akin to intermittent offending discussed by scholars such as Glaser 





contemporaneous participation in legal and illegal work, participation in both legal 
work and illegal work at different months will not be tackled. 
In sum, I have presented general descriptive information on the prevalence of 
engaging in legal work, illegal work and the overlap of legal and illegal work. 
Prevalence rates demonstrate that, as expected, there were gender and race 
differences in the participation of legal work and illegal work. In terms of the overlap, 
males were much more likely to engage in the overlap than females. Interestingly, 
Whites were also slightly more likely to engage in the overlap compared to Blacks 
and Hispanics. There appeared to be little site differences. Although prevalence rates 
provide an interesting first step at looking at the relationship between legal and illegal 
work, it does not take into account how patterns of participation might differ across 
various subpopulations. To account for population heterogeneity, I turned to group 
based trajectory models. First, I estimated trajectories of participation in legal work. 
Second, I estimated trajectories of participation in illegal work. Finally to uncover the 
joint patterns of legal and illegal work, I estimated a dual trajectory model. 
Analytic Plan and Models 
 
Each of the three research questions requires a slightly different analytic 
approach and will be outlined individually below. The current study examines the 
overlap between legal and illegal work in two main ways. First, I examine 
heterogeneity in the overlap over time by using semi-parametric group based 
trajectory models (Nagin, 2005). Group-based trajectory models (GBTM) is an 
extension of finite mixture modeling for longitudinal data. According to Nagin (1999) 





estimate the proportion of the sample that follows each of the trajectory groups, 3) to 
estimate an individual’s conditional probability of belonging to each of the model’s 
groups, given their longitudinal vector of observations.2  
Using GBTM is beneficial for a number of reasons. First, it allows me to 
identify distinctive developmental paths in complex longitudinal data and to capture 
the heterogeneity of behavior over time. That is, GBTM provides a way to 
descriptively summarize the patterns of legal work and illegal work without a priori 
assumptions of how many and what the patterns of participation of legal work and 
illegal might look like. Thus, GBTM allow me to model population heterogeneity in 
the longitudinal involvement in legal and illegal employment. Population 
heterogeneity is important to account for because we know that among offenders, 
there is substantial movement into and out of both the labor force and offending 
(Uggen and Wakefield, 2008). Employment and offending patterns can reflect 
subpopulations of which the sources of heterogeneity may not be readily observable. 
Second, I can use group membership for a variety of further analyses like relating the 
probability of membership to individual characteristics and circumstances and 
creating profiles of group members or examining the correlates of group membership.  
Interest in revealing these subpopulations may be important because it draws 
attention to the different covariates and outcomes of different developmental 
trajectories (Nagin and Odgers, 2010). Studying different covariates and outcomes 
can have the potential to inform specific policies and programs related to 
                                                 
2 I am careful through this analysis not to reify any of the estimated trajectory groups; instead, I stress 
that this descriptive technique is purely a descriptive mechanism for exploring population 
heterogeneity in longitudinal patterns of study outcomes.  It is important to note that due to the select 





incarceration and crime prevention. Finally, an extension of GBTM, dual trajectory 
analysis, allows for modeling two outcomes by estimating the joint and conditional 
probabilities of legal and illegal work over time.  
Research Question One 
 
My first research question is concerned with extensively documenting the 
patterns of legal work, illegal work and their overlap over age. As such, GBTM were 
conducted on participation in legal and illegal work and I used dual trajectory 
analysis to model the joint evolution of the two. A unique aspect of the Pathways 
Study is that it contains 84 months of data on participation in legal and illegal work. 
This is extremely advantageous for estimating GBTM because, like all longitudinal 
models the asymptotic properties of consistent parameter estimation are more 
dependent on the number of time points, T than the cross-sectional sample size N 
(Greene, 1999). More intuitively in the present context, this means that population 
heterogeneity is better revealed by following the sample over a longer, more granular 
time frame, on top of merely having an adequately large cross-sectional sample 
(Loughran and Nagin, 2006).  To my knowledge there have been no prior studies that 
have fitted trajectory models on such a fine grained unit of analysis, including studies 
on criminal involvement.  
Analytic Considerations 
 
There were two important analytic considerations prior to estimating the 
GBTM for legal work and illegal work. The first consideration was whether or not to 
include the months in which the individuals were under the age of 18. This is an 





First, there are restrictions in terms of the hours and types of work adolescents are 
allowed to engage in. For example, Arizona restricts employment of individuals 
under age 16 (Arizona's Youth Employment Law) and Pennsylvania restricts 
employment for individuals under the age of 17 (Pennsylvania Child Labor Act).  
Second, there has been considerable attention devoted to examining the relationship 
between adolescent problem behaviors and work, especially intensive work. The 
conclusion regarding the relationship is still contentious with some scholars arguing 
that work in adolescence is associated with a host of problem behaviors, including 
substance use and delinquency (Bachman and Schulenberg, 1993; Greenberger and 
Steinberg, 1986; Monahan, Lee and Steinberg, 2011). While other scholars argue that 
once selection effects are accounted for, the positive relationship between intensive 
work and delinquency disappears (i.e. Apel et al., 2007; Paternoster et al., 2003; Staff 
et al., 2010).  
Given the contention surrounding the relationship between adolescent work 
and delinquency, I excluded observations where the participant was under 18 years of 
age. However as sensitivity analysis, I estimated GBTM of legal work and illegal 
work on the entire sample including observations under the age of 18. In general, the 
trajectory solutions were very similar for both legal and illegal work, suggesting that 
omitting the observations under the age of 18 did not impact the number or shape of 
the trajectory groups.  
The second analytic consideration is exclusion of an exposure time correction. 
Exposure time, or the time that an offender is in the community and not incapacitated, 





(Blumstein and Cohen, 1979). Correcting for exposure time essentially ‘adjusts’ what 
the rate would be if the offender was not incapacitated. Essentially, the exposure time 
correction is used for obtaining a better estimate of lambda, which can affect the true 
shapes of the trajectory.  However, for a logit model, a ‘lambda’ adjustment is not 
appropriate given that a participant’s participation in legal or illegal work is actually 
observed. Moreover, the focus of the current study is to uncover heterogeneity and 
membership between legal and illegal work. 
Piquero et al. (2001) specifically investigate the extent to which exposure time 
correction impacts conclusions about trajectory structures.  Using data from the 
California Youth Authority, they examined the annual arrest rates among parolees 
from age 18 to 33 and compared estimates with and without adjusting for exposure 
time. Piquero and colleagues (2001) found that the general shape of the arrest rate 
trends were robust to exposure time controls. They argue however that controls for 
exposure time have greatest impact on the most active offenders. That is, the 
persistent offending group should increase once exposure time is accounted for. As 
sensitivity analysis, I compared the trajectory solutions with and without the exposure 
time correction. Similar to Piquero et al. (2001), I found that the overall shape of both 
the legal and illegal groups were largely unaffected by the exposure time correction. 
In fact, membership in all the groups was virtually identical.   
To examine participation in legal work and participation in illegal work, the 







The above equation represents the most basic version of group based trajectory 
models. It models a dependent variable over age with a polynomial function (Nagin et 
al., 2003: 349).  Here,  the dependent variable for an individual i=1,…,N at time 
t=1,…,T given membership in group j=1,...,J. Each group’s trajectory is defined by 
the parameters . The three key outputs are: the trajectories 
themselves, the mixture probabilities (proportion of the sample follows each 
trajectory) and the posteriors probabilities (the probability of membership in 
trajectory group j given an individual’s longitudinal string of observations, Yi). 
An extension of the basic model is the dual trajectory model, which was 
developed to examine the developmental course of two distinct but related outcomes 
(Nagin and Tremblay, 2001). Moreover, the dual trajectory model is used to analyze 
connections between developmental trajectories of two outcomes that are evolving 
contemporaneously (i.e., legal and illegal work) (Jones and Nagin, 2007). One 
advantage of the dual trajectory model over looking at cross-sectional correlations is 
it provides the capability of examining the linkage between the dynamic unfolding of 
the two behaviors over the entire observation period (Jones and Nagin, 2007). The 
chief additional output provided by the dual mode  are the probabilities linking 
membership in trajectory groups across the two outcomes  For example, these 
quantities can be thought of as the conditional (i.e., marginal) probability of following 
a certain legal employment trajectory given illegal work trajectory, and the joint 
probability of following either trajectory. This method also allows me to directly link 





dual model, I examine the developmental course of legal work, illegal work and 
probability of the two overlapping. 
In addition to estimating dual trajectory models of legal and illegal work, I 
generated profiles of the groups that emerge from the trajectory models. To 
accomplish this, I used the classify-analyze method (Roeder et al., 1999). That is, I 
hard-classified the sample into their respective trajectory groups, regardless of 
classification uncertainty. According to Roeder et al. (1999) if the mean posterior 
probability for the group, is at least .70 then the classify-analyze method provides a 
decent approximation. It is important to recognize that the variables occur 
contemporaneously with the trajectory estimation period and therefore causal 
inferences cannot be made. Nonetheless, creating group profiles provides insight on 
how the groups uncovered by the GBTM differ, beyond participation in legal and 
illegal work. To generate group profiles I calculated the conditional expected value of 
the set of contemporaneous measures based on trajectory membership. 
Research Question Two 
 
Research question two considers the individual level factors associated with 
the various probabilities3 between legal and illegal work. The dual trajectory model 
can be extended to allow the conditional probabilities linking the trajectories of legal 
and illegal work to vary as a function of individual level factors, or events that occur 
near the time of transition (Nagin, 2005). In the dual model, I estimate J trajectories 
of legal work and K trajectories of illegal work, the unconditional probability of 
membership in each legal work trajectories, πj, and the conditional probability of 
                                                 
3 While it is typical for scholars to use the term “transition” probability to refer to changes in states, I 





membership in in the kth illegal work trajectory given membership in the jth legal 
work trajectory, πk|j.  Similarly, it is straightforward to calculate the reverse marginal 
probabilities, i.e., the conditional membership in legal work trajectory given 
membership in illegal trajectory, πj|k. Importantly, this is akin to conditioning on the 
legal work trajectory when interpreting the coefficients, hence the multiple sets of 
comparisons. Here, the probabilities are dependent upon wi, a vector of variables 
measured at baseline that are hypothesized to be associated with πk|j.  
 
The parameters of this model which correspond to risk factors are estimated 
simultaneously with the probabilities via maximum likelihood using a constrained 
logit function.  Interpretation follows a basic generalized logit framework, which is a 
logistic regression that is extended to outcomes with multiple categories. The 
generalized logit model fits the ratio of the expected proportion for each category of 
the dependent variable over the expected proportion of a reference category. The 
coefficients are interpreted as log odds ratios, just as in the binary logistic model; 
hypothesis tests and confidence intervals are constructed similarly. Interpretation 
depends on the outcome category or a reference group.   
An important assumption of the above model is that the effects of the 
variables wi are constrained to be equal across all the j trajectory groups in the legal 
groups. In other words, the effects of the variables on the conditional probabilities to 
specific illegal groups do not interact with membership in the legal groups (Nagin, 
2005). In the current study, I estimate whether or not legal economic opportunities are 





being in a particular legal work group. Because the model is streamlined to make 
estimation more feasible, it is assumed that the effects of the variables are the same 
across all legal groups, though the coefficients can be compared across legal work 
groups. The intercepts for each probability however varies and thus membership in a 
particular legal work group can still influence membership in illegal work groups, 
controlling for other variables.     
Research Question Three 
 
Research question three moves away from the trajectory groups and compares 
engaging in the legal/illegal overlap to engaging in illegal work only on two criminal 
career dimensions:   offending frequency and offending variety.  Research question 
three uses data from the ten recall periods, as opposed to the monthly calendar data. 
The reason why I do the analyses at the recall level rather than the monthly level is 
that the measures at the recall level are much richer and thus allow me to control for 
many of the variables that are important to offending frequency and offending 
variety. I also conduct the analyses cross-sectionally rather than looking at within 
individual differences. As a first step, I wanted to explore the relationship between 
the overlap and criminal career dimensions across persons. By doing cross-sectional 
analyses I can also increase the number of observations of the overlap and illegal 
work only. The data are structured the data in a way that the units of analysis are the 
recall periods, which are nested within individuals. A person has potentially up to 10 
observations, depending on how many observational periods the participant was 
under the age of 18 and how many recall periods he/she reported being engaged in the 





multiple observations, I adjust for inter-individual correlations and clustering of 
observations within larger units.   
The frequency of offending is measured  
ln(freqi) = β0 + β1overlapi + β2zι + εi 
where ln(freqi) is the natural log of the self-reported instrumental offending rate and 
overlap is an indicator of engaging in both legal and illegal work during the recall 
period and zi is a vector which includes all of the control variables.    
Similarly the specialization equation is: 
speci = β0 + β1overlapi + β2zι + εi 
where speci is the proportion of instrumental crimes over all crimes (or alternatively, 
the variety proportion of instrumental crimes) and overlap is an indicator of engaging 
in both legal and illegal work during the recall period and zi is a vector which 
includes all of the control variables.   It is important to note that causal interpretation 







Chapter 4: RESULTS 
Research Question One: Heterogeneity in Legal and Illegal 
Work 
 
Recall the first research question was: Are there heterogeneous patterns of 
legal work and illegal work? What is the heterogeneity in joint development of legal 
and illegal work?  This question was answered by turning to group based trajectory 
models to examine differential patterns in the sample with respect to participation in 
legal work and illegal work over 84 months. A dual trajectory model was estimated to 
analyze the contemporaneous evolution between legal and illegal work. 
Group Based Trajectory Models 
 
 Model selection requires determination of the number of groups that best 
describes the data. Determination of the optimal number of groups is based on an 
interplay between “formal statistical criteria and subjective judgment” (Nagin, 2005: 
61). I followed a two-stage model selection process. First,  I followed the lead of 
D’Unger, Land, McCall, and Nagin (1998) and used the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) as a basis for choosing the optimal number of groups in the mixture 
model,  which requires estimating models with varying number of groups and 
selecting the largest BIC score. However, the BIC score is not always the best and 
only criteria for the optimal number of groups. It is best considered in conjunction 
with judgment of the researcher. For example, sometimes the BIC score continues to 
increase with the more number of groups and it is prudent to stop when there are no 





of substantive interest. Model selection is a balance between the parsimony of the 
model and reporting the distinctive patterns in the data (Nagin, 2005).  
After determining the number of groups, I focused on the ideal order of the 
polynomials that specified the shape of each trajectory. Based on Nagin’s (2005) 
advice, I used a preset rule of starting with all quadratics and then adjusting so that 
the groups contain the highest order term that were statistically significant. 
Importantly, this adjustment is generally less central to both model identification and 
my subsequent interpretation than settling on the optimal number of groups. 
Additionally, the average posterior assignment probabilities for the final five group 
model are all above 85%, indicating a reasonably low classification error (Roeder, 
Lynch and Nagin, 1999). Table 4 reports BIC scores for models with four, five and 
six groups. Although the six group solution had the largest BIC score, the sixth group 
did not reveal any new substantive patterns in the data.   
 
Table 4. Bayesian Information Criterion BIC for Selection of Legal Work Trajectories (n=1320) 
 
 Order BIC AIC 
4 group 1  2  2  3 -35923.30 -35881.82 
 2  2  3  3 -35855.41 -35811.33 
 2  2  2  2 -35893.90 -35855.01 
    
5 group 1 1 2 3 3 -35021.21 -34971.95 
 1 1 2 2 3 -35076.06 -35029.4 
 1 2 3 3 3 -34962.98 -34908.53 
 2 2 2 2 2 -35081.69 -35032.43 
    
6 group 2 2 2 2 2 2 -34286.68 -34211.49 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the best solution for the legal work trajectories. As 
expected, there was a low stable group that maintained a low probability of 





groups that increased the probability of their participation in legal work: the low 
increasing and the moderately increasing groups. The low increasing group (20%) 
started with relatively low participation and slightly increased the probability of 
participation to a moderate level as they aged. The moderate increasing group 
(14.5%) began at a low-moderate probability of participation but increased much 
more drastically than the low-increasing group, to a probability of approximately .90 
and appeared to remain high in their legal work participation. Also as expected, there 
was a group, characterized as high stable that comprised 17.5% of the sample. These 
individuals’ probability of engaging in legal work was consistently high (between .75 
and .90) across the study period. Unexpectedly, the moderate declining (14.5%) 
group emerged. This group began the study period with a moderate level of 
participation in legal work and actually decreased their probability of engaging in 
legal work over time.  








I followed the same process of choosing the best solution for the trajectories 
of illegal work participation as I did for the legal work trajectories. Table 5 displays 
the BIC and AIC for three, four and five groups. I chose the four group solution over 
the five group solution because the fifth group comprised of a very small proportion 
of the sample (less than 4%). Similar to the legal trajectory groups, the average 
posterior assignment probabilities for all four of the illegal groups were above 85%, 
suggesting good model fit. 
Table 5 Bayesian Information Criterion BIC for Selection of Illegal Work Trajectories (n=1320) 
 
 Order BIC AIC 
3 group 2 2 2 -14176.8 -14148.3 
 1 2 2 -14175.9 -14150 
    
4 group 2 2 2 2 -13539.4 -13500.5 
 1 2 2 2 -13628.5 -13592.2 
 1 2 3 3 -13632.2 -13590.7 
 1 1 2 2 -13627.1 -13593.4 
    
5 group 2 2 2 2 2 -13149.5 -13100.2 
 
As expected, the largest group of the illegal work trajectories was the low 
stable group, which comprised of 64.4% of the sample (Figure 12). This group did 
not participate in illegal work across the entire study period. There were two 
declining groups: the moderate declining group (18.6%) and the high declining group 
(6.1%). The moderate declining group had a steady and consistent decline in the 
probability of participation in illegal work across the age profile. This group began 
with a probability of about .28 at the age of 18 and their probability of participating in 
illegal work declined to approximately zero by the end of the study period. The shape 





moderate level of participation in illegal work (about .45) and actually increased their 
probability of participation in illegal work during their late teens. By their early 20s 
however; the high declining group decreased their participation markedly from .55 to 
.35. Interestingly, the “low increasing” group emerged. This group made up 10.4% of 
the sample and although they started at a low probability of engaging in illegal work, 
by the end of the study period, their probability of engaging in illegal work surpassed 
the level of the high declining group.  




To examine how demographic characteristics are related to membership in the 
various legal and illegal groups, I conducted the classify-analyze method. That is, I 
hard classified participants into their respective groups and treated the groups as a 
subsample of the entire sample. Because the mean posterior probability for the group 





approximation.4 Table 6 displays the results of the legal and illegal trajectory groups 
by demographic characteristics.  I conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test 
differences between two or more of the means. When comparing across the legal 
work trajectory groups, there were significant differences between the low stable and 
high stable groups in terms of gender, race and site. The low stable group consisted of 
the highest proportion of males whereas the moderately declining group contained the 
lowest proportion of males. The high stable group contained the highest proportion of 
Whites and the low stable group had the smallest proportion. Conversely, Blacks 
made up over 50% of the low stable group and only 19% of the high stable group. 
There were no differences between the legal trajectory groups in terms of Hispanics.  
The high stable group was disproportionately made up of participants from Phoenix 
(70%) and the low stable group was comprised mostly of participants from 
Philadelphia (59%).  
There were significant differences for gender and race between the illegal 
work trajectory groups. Males made up the highest proportion (96%) of the high 
declining group and the least in the low increasing group (83%). Blacks made up 55% 
of the high declining group but only 38% of the low increasing group. Less than a 
quarter (23%) of the high declining group consisted of Hispanics while the low 
increasing group made contained 37% Hispanics. There were no significant site 
differences between the illegal trajectory groups.   
                                                 
4 The concern with the classify-analyze method is that it does not take into account the uncertainty of 
group assignment and therefore might produce incorrect inferences. However Roeder et al. (2012) 
show that if there is little uncertainty about latent class membership, assigning subjects to the latent 






Table 6 Trajectory Groups by Demographic Covariates 
 
 Legal work trajectory groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 





















































 Illegal work trajectory groups 
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* Analysis of Variance p<.05 
 
Dual Trajectories of Legal and Illegal Work  
 
To unpack the intertwined relationship between legal and illegal work, I turn 
to the dual trajectory model. Similar to single trajectory models, the dual model 
allows me to account for population heterogeneity underlying the associations 
between legal work and illegal work. Above and beyond the estimates associated with 





conditional probabilities and joint probabilities of legal work and illegal work. . These 
probabilities are the key additional outputs from the dual model; for the purposes of 
estimation, starting values for the trajectory shape parameters were obtained from the 
respective single solutions (Jones and Nagin, 2007).    
Figures 13, 14 and 15 graphically display conditional probabilities and joint 
probabilities of legal work and illegal work (see Table 1, Appendix A for a tabular 
representation of the estimates). Figure 13 illustrates the probability of membership in 
a particular legal work group conditional on membership in a particular illegal work 
group. That is, given membership in a particular illegal group, what is the probability 
of membership in a particular legal group? It is important however to note that the 
conditional probabilities do not imply causal or temporal ordering between legal and 
illegal group membership. Because the probabilities are conditional on membership 
in a given illegal trajectory group, each column of probabilities in Figure 13 sums to 
1. 
There are two notable observations in Figure 13. First, there was considerable 
variation in the conditional probabilities within each legal work group. The 
probability of membership in a particular legal work group varied greatly depending 
on membership in which illegal work group. For example, there was a probability of 
.46 of being in the low stable work group conditional on being in the high declining 
illegal group. However, the probability of being the low stable work group dropped to 
only .24 if the membership was in the low stable illegal work group. If converted to 
odds ratios, membership in the low stable legal group was 2.68 times greater for 





illegal group. The moderately declining legal group emerged as an interesting and an 
unexpected group. The highest probability of membership in this group was 
membership in the low stable illegal group (.21). Interestingly, the conditional 
probability of membership in the moderately declining legal group was 0 given 
membership in the high declining illegal group.  
The second notable observation is that there was considerable variation across 
the legal trajectory groups. Looking at the first set of columns (Figure 13), we see the 
probability of being in the low stable legal work groups was the highest (about .45) 
conditional on participants being in the high declining illegal work group. However, 
the probability of being in the legal moderate declining group is 0 given being in the 
illegal high declining group. Looking at the legal groups from left to right, the 
probability of being in the low stable, low increasing, moderate declining and 
moderately increasing legal groups conditional on being in the low increasing illegal 
group decreased monotonically from .35, .30, .11 and .05, respectively.  This shows 
that membership in the low increasing group was differentially related membership in 
particular legal groups.   
Figure 14 displays the results of the probability of being in an illegal work 
trajectory group conditional on being in a particular legal trajectory group. Similar to 
Figure 14, there were variations both within illegal groups and between illegal 
groups. Here, each row of probabilities sums to 1. The conditional probabilities of 
being in the low stable illegal group were all relatively high because the low stable 
illegal group comprised of over 64% of the sample. However, there was a .82 





moderately declining legal group whereas there was a considerably lower probability 
of membership in the low stable illegal group given belonging to the low stable legal 
group (.51).  In terms of odds ratios, membership in the low stable illegal group was 
4.3 times greater given membership in the moderately declining legal group 
compared to membership in the low stable legal group. There was a .26 probability of 
membership in the moderately declining illegal group conditional on being in the low 
stable legal group but only a .10 probability conditional on being in the moderately 
declining group (an odds ratio of 3.18).  
Across illegal groups, membership in the high stable legal group was most 
predictive of being in the low stable illegal group (.71) and least predictive of being in 
the high declining illegal group (.06). That is, being in the low stable illegal group 
was considerable higher than membership in the high declining illegal group given 
membership in the high stable legal group. Membership in the low stable legal group 
was associated with a .26 probability of membership in the moderately declining 
illegal group but only a .09 probability of membership in the high declining illegal 






Figure 13 Probability of Legal Work Group Conditional on Illegal Work Group 
 
 
Figure 14 Probability of Illegal Work Group Conditional on Legal Work Group 
 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the results of the joint probabilities of being in the 
respective legal work and illegal work trajectory groups. The joint probabilities are 





previous probabilities these are unconditional. Figure 15 displays the probabilities of 
all the possible combinations of legal and illegal trajectory groups. Thus, all the joint 
probabilities sum to 1. One noteworthy pattern emerged from Figure 15:  there 
appeared to be opposing patterns of legal and illegal work, characteristic of a 
mirrored pattern between the two trajectories. More specifically, increased 
participation in legal work was related to the declining participation in illegal work. 
For example, there was a .09 probability that the moderate increasing legal group 
jointly occurred with the high declining illegal group. Similarly, the joint probability 
of the legal low increasing group and the illegal moderately declining group was .04. 
The probability of being in both the legal high stable legal group and the low stable 
illegal group was also relatively high (.12). In contrast, there were parallel pathways 
between legal and illegal work trajectories. These findings are important because they 
suggest that it is rare for trajectories of high involvement in legal work to jointly 





Figure 15 Joint Probability of Legal Work Group and Illegal Work Group 
 
 
The goal of the first research question was to take an in-depth look at the 
descriptive patterns of legal work, illegal work, and how they overlap. I turned to 
estimating group based trajectories of legal work and illegal work to examine these 
descriptive patterns while simultaneously taking into account population 
heterogeneity. Several unexpected patterns emerged. For example the moderate 
declining group decreased their probability of participation in legal work. To further 
examine demographic characteristics, I created group profiles of the various 
trajectory groups. Gender and race were significantly different across at least two of 
the groups (legal and illegal) while there were site differences only across the legal 
work trajectory groups. Finally, I estimated a dual trajectory model to examine the 
various ways that legal work and illegal work can overlap. Overall, results of the dual 
trajectory model suggest that there was considerable variation in the probability of 





group and vice versa. In general however, it was observed that high involvement in 
legal work was associated with low involvement in illegal work. 
Research Question Two: Legal Economic Opportunities 
 
The first research question examined the descriptive patterns of legal work, 
illegal work and their overlap. In doing so, I estimated a dual trajectory model which 
estimated the conditional and joint probabilities of legal and illegal trajectory groups. 
Research question two examined individual level factors that are associated with the 
various conditional probabilities between legal and illegal work.  It is important to 
note that the model only allows for time stable predictors and thus all the variables 
were taken from the baseline interview and are not time-varying. The current 
investigation focused on how economic opportunities measured at baseline might 
alter the probabilities of being in various illegal work trajectories, conditional on legal 
group membership. Economic opportunities were measured through three main 
constructs: The first one is an indicator of neighborhood conditions. This was 
included because prior literature emphasizes that neighborhood structure can impact 
the probability of engaging in illegal work, despite engaging (i.e. Freeman, 1996; 
Sullivan, 1989). Specifically neighborhood disorganization and deterioration can 
constrain legal economic opportunities and push individuals to engage in illegal work 
in addition to legal work. It is expected that the greater the neighborhood 
disorganization, the higher probability of membership in a high illegal group.  
The second construct taps into perceived neighborhood opportunities for 
legitimate work. Prior research suggests that individuals who have few legitimate 





wages (Horowitz, 1983). Therefore, it is expected that lower perceptions of legitimate 
opportunities should be positively related to membership into higher illegal work 
groups, particularly for individuals in lower legal work groups. 
The third construct was inspired by anomie/strain theories, which posit that 
the disjunction between expectations and aspirations can be a source of stress or 
strain and can push an individual to take on illegal activities (Merton, 1938; 1968). 
Thus, the items measure the disjunction between economic expectations and 
economic aspirations. There are two main reasons for inclusion of the strain measures 
as indicators of legal economic opportunities in the current context. First, as 
individuals’ economic expectations fall short, he/she is more likely to engage in 
“whatever means necessary” to close the expectations/aspirations gap (Merton, 1968). 
Membership in a high illegal group, is a way to achieve greater monetary success. 
Second, the effect of the expectations/aspirations gap should have similar impact on 
membership in higher illegal groups, regardless of which legal group an individual 
belongs to. For example, Merton (1938: 680) argues that the “pursuit of pecuniary 
success” are goals that transcend class lines. Chapter 3 provided a description of all 
the variables.  
 Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics on the measures used in the analyses 
for research question two. All the variables were taken from the baseline interview, 
which occurred prior to the estimation of the trajectories. It appears that participants 
generally viewed their legitimate opportunities (at baseline) as relatively low.  In 
terms of expectations and aspirations for success, on average, expectations seem to 





onset was 14.9 years and parent index of social position was relatively low. At 
baseline, less than 10% of the participants had children and scored a 2.9 out of 5 on 
impulse control and 2.3 out of 4 for future orientation.  
 Prior to estimating the final models for research question two, I tested whether 
or not the four perceived opportunity items loaded onto a single factor. The items did 
not load onto one factor, suggesting that they do not belong to one latent construct. I 
similarly conducted a factor analysis on the three expectations fall short items and 
results indicated that they did not belong to one factor and therefore, they were 





Table 7 . Descriptive Information of Predictors of Conditional Probabilities (n=1320) 
 
Variable at Baseline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min, Max 
    
Neighborhood conditions 2.348 .754 1, 4 
    
Perceptions of opportunities:    
In my neighborhood easy for young person 
to get good job* 
3.031 1.084 1, 5 
In my neighborhood hard to make money 
w/o doing something illegal 
2.889 1.142 1, 5 
Not much opportunity to succeed as kids 
from other neighborhoods 
2.429 1.031 1, 5 
Employers around here often hire young 
people from this neighborhood 
3.442 .708 1, 5 
    
Expectations fall short    
Important to have a good job or career -1.255 1.135 -4, 4 
Earning a good living* -1.093 1.012 -4, 2 
Providing a good home for family* -1.016 .989 -4, 2 
    
Controls:    
Male* .867 - 0, 1 
Philadelphia  .521 - 0, 1 
Black .417 - 0, 1 
Hispanic .334 - 0, 1 
Age of onset* 14.934 1.635 9.1, 18.42 
Parent index of social position* 51.4786 12.166 11, 77 
Children .091 .288 0, 1 
Impulse control* 2.954 .952 1, 5 
Future orientation* 2.331 .549 1, 4 
*p<.10 
 
Extending the dual trajectory model to include covariates in the probabilities 
linking legal work and illegal work trajectories requires considerable computing 
resources and therefore I conducted separate bivariate analyses of all the predictors on 
the probabilities to determine which of the key items and control variables were 
significantly related to the relationship between legal and illegal work. If the predictor 
was significant at α=.10, it was included in the final models. Table 7 displays an 





the four perceived opportunities measures (in my neighborhood easy for young 
person to get good job) and two out of the three expectations fall short measures 
(earning a good living and providing a good home for family) were significantly 
related to the conditional probabilities.  
Tables 8 through13 display the results for research question two. There are 
two main components associated with the main tables (tables 8, 10 and 11. First, there 
are a set a coefficients for each illegal trajectory group except for the low increasing 
illegal trajectory. This is because for each trajectory group, the estimate should be 
interpreted as the effect of the variable on the probability of membership to that 
illegal work trajectory relative to the low increasing illegal trajectory. Second, there 
are a set of coefficents for Ƴ illegal group|legal group for each of the illegal groups.  These 
coefficients represent the intercepts of the probabilities.   
Table 8 examines the effect of perceptions of economic opportunities on the 
conditional probabilities.  Model 1 measures the effect of the perception that it is easy 
for a young person to get a job in his/her neighborhood, measured at baseline, on 
membership in various illegal work groups, conditional on membership in the 
particular legal groups. The perception that it is easy for a young person in his/her 
neighborhood to get a job was marginally significant for membership in the high 
declining illegal group compared to membership in the low increasing illegal group. 
Model 2 includes the control variables that emerged as significant in the bivariate 
analyses. Three of the control variables were significantly related to membership in 
the low stable illegal group compared to the low increasing illegal group. Males 





low increasing illegal group. Whereas, the higher the parental social economic status 
and impulse control, the greater the probability of membership in the low stable 
illegal group compared to the low increasing illegal group. However, parental social 
economic status and impulse control were not associated with the moderate declining 
illegal group compared to the low increasing illegal group. The greater the future 
orientation, the lower the probability of membership in the moderate declining illegal 
group compared to the low increasing illegal group. The effect of perceptions of 
opportunities remains not significant except for the high declining illegal group when 
compared to the low increasing illegal group. The effect however is positive when 






Table 8 Membership in Illegal Work Trajectories - Easy to Get a Job 
 
† p<.10 * p<.05 **p< .01 *** p< .001 
low increasing illegal group is the reference group 
 
Variable at baseline Coefficient t-score Coefficient t-score 
 1 2 
     
Low stable      
Easy for young person to get good job -0.036 -0.418 0.076 1.027 
Controls:     
Male - - -0.828** -3.105 
Age of onset - - -0.073 -1.407 
Parent index of social position - - 0.019** 2.940 
Impulse control - - 0.313*** 3.529 
Future orientation - - 0.051 0.346 
Ƴ 2|1 -1.263*** -4.006 0.285 0.280 
Ƴ 2|2 -1.139** -3.468 0.492 0.475 
Ƴ 2|3 -1.076*** -4.846 1.370 1.300 
Ƴ 2|4 -2.794*** -5.774 0.976 0.933 
Ƴ 2|5 -2.335*** -5.928 1.606 1.517 
     
Moderate declining      
Easy for young person to get good job -0.089 -1.253 0.092 0.858 
Controls:     
Male - - 0.904Ɨ 1.730 
Age of onset - - -0.099 -1.362 
Parent index of social position - - 0.012 1.259 
Impulse control - - 0.183 1.460 
Future orientation - - -0.439* -2.020 
Ƴ 3|1 -0.427Ɨ -1.731 -0.410 -0.277 
Ƴ 3|2 -0.783** -2.827 -0.155 -0.103 
Ƴ 3|3 -1.519*** 0.324 .0362 0.238 
Ƴ 3|4 -1.187*** -3.940 -1.406 -0.897 
Ƴ 3|5 -1.724*** -5.432 -0.260 -0.170 
     
High declining      
Easy for young person to get good job -0.186Ɨ -1.696 0.246Ɨ 1.804 
Controls:     
Male - - 1.075 1.405 
Age of onset - - -0.075 -0.823 
Parent index of social position - - -0.021Ɨ -1.689 
Impulse control - - 0.123 0.771 
Future orientation - - -0.367 -1.296 
Ƴ 4|1 -1.163** -3.214 1.179 0.613 
Ƴ 4|2 -1.672*** -3.937 0.897 0.457 
Ƴ 4|3 -1.940*** 0.439 1.436 0.721 
Ƴ 4|4 -2.335*** -4.597 0.846 0.427 





To illustrate the results of Table 8 further, Table 9 displays the odds ratios and 
probabilities of membership in the high declining illegal group compared to 
membership in the low increasing illegal group for each illegal work group. For each 
unit increase in the perception that it is easy for a person to get a job in his/her 
neighborhood, the odds of membership in the high declining illegal group compared 
to membership in the low increasing illegal group is reduced by .544 for the low 
stable legal group. Looking across the legal groups the effect is lowest for the high 
stable legal group, which would be consistent with expectations.  
Table 9 Change in Odds of Membership from Each Legal Work Trajectory to the High 
Declining Illegal Trajectory  
 
Perception that it is easy to get a job 
 Low stable Low increasing Mod declining Mod increasing High stable 
Odds 0.544 0.316 0.388 0.633 0.171 
Low increasing illegal group is the comparison group 
 
Table 10 considers the effect of how expectations fall short regarding earning 
a good living, measured at baseline, is related to the conditional probabilities. Recall 
that the variable was constructed by subtracting a participant’s rating of his/her 
aspirations of earning a good living from his/her expectations of earning a good 
living. Model 1 reveals that as expectations of earning a good living fall short, the 
higher the probability of membership in the high declining illegal group compared to 
the low increasing legal group. Model 2 includes the control variables and this 
relationship remains positive and significant. Several control variables were also 
significant in Table 10. Being male reduced the probability of membership in the low 
stable and moderate declining groups compared to the low increasing group. But, 





compared to the reference group. The higher the future orientation, the higher the 
probability of belonging to the low stable group and the moderate declining group 
compared to the low increasing group. Similarly, the higher the age of onset, the 
greater the probability of membership in the moderately declining group compared to 
the low increasing group and the greater the parental social status the lower the 
probability of being in the high declining illegal group compared to the low 








Table 10 Membership in Illegal Work Trajectories - Earn a Good Living 
 
† p<.10 * p<.05 **p< .01 *** p< .001 
Low increasing illegal group is the reference group 
Variable at baseline Coefficient t-score Coefficient t-score 
 1 2 
     
Low stable      
Earning a good living 0.168† 1.821 0.141 0.143 
Controls:     
Male - - -1.435** -3.299 
Age of onset - - 0.069 1.150 
Parent index of social position - - 0.007 0.911 
Impulse control - - 0.106 1.004 
Future orientation - - 0.521** 2.734 
Ƴ 2|1 1.552*** 7.364 -0.055 -0.045 
Ƴ 2|2 1.423*** 6.398 -0.241 -0.194 
Ƴ 2|3 2.047*** 7.595 0.239 0.192 
Ƴ 2|4 2.622*** 8.835 1.321 1.024 
Ƴ 2|5 3.093*** 7.456 0.900 0.718 
     
Moderate declining      
Earning a good living 0.158 1.446 0.182 1.593 
Controls:     
Male - - -0.573 -1.151 
Age of onset - - 0.159* 2.139 
Parent index of social position - - -0.011 -1.230 
Impulse control - - -0.218Ɨ -1.698 
Future orientation - - 0.497* 2.216 
Ƴ 3|1 0.867*** 3.629 -0.846 -0.571 
Ƴ 3|2 0.398 1.482 -1.291 -0.855 
Ƴ 3|3 0.232 0.644 -1.739 -1.136 
Ƴ 3|4 0.608 1.639 -0.178 -0.115 
Ƴ 3|5 1.661*** 3.647 -1.300 -0.847 
     
High declining      
Earning a good living 0.335* 2.306 0.289* 1.958 
Controls:     
Male - - 0.342 0.454 
Age of onset - - 0.130 1.404 
Parent index of social position - - -0.027* -2.186 
Impulse control - - -0.085 -0.529 
Future orientation - - 0.107 00375 
Ƴ 4|1 0.030 0.108 -0.896 -0.475 
Ƴ 4|2 -0.612 -1.715 -1.441 -0.746 
Ƴ 4|3 -0.230 -0.569 -1.235 -0.637 
Ƴ 4|4 -0.769 -1.428 -0.746 -0.377 





 Table 11 illustrates the odds ratios and the probabilities of membership in the 
high declining illegal group compared to the low increasing illegal group. For every 
unit increase in the disjunction between expectations and aspirations regarding 
earning a good living, the odds of being in the high stable illegal group compared to 
being in the low increasing illegal group increases by 4.1 for members of the low 
stable legal group. For members of the high stable legal group, the odds of being in 
the high stable illegal group increases by 2.3, suggesting that although the effect of 
the expectations/aspirations gap is consistent for all legal trajectory groups, it is the 
highest for the  low stable legal work group. 
Table 11 Change in Odds of Membership from Each Legal Work Trajectory to the High 
Declining Illegal Trajectory 
 
Earning a good living 
 Low stable Low increasing Mod declining Mod increasing High stable 
Odds 4.157 3.136 5.376 2.980 2.307 
Low increasing illegal group is the reference group 
 
Finally, Table 12 shows the results of the relationship between expectations 
fall short regarding providing for a good home for your family (measured at baseline) 
and the probabilities of membership in the various illegal work groups. Model 1 
shows that the smaller the expectations/aspirations gap of proving for family, the 
greater the probability of belonging to the low stable illegal group and the moderately 
declining illegal group. However, expectations fall short regarding providing for a 
good home for your family did not differentiate between membership in the high 
declining group compared to membership in the low stable illegal group. Model 2 





gap of proving for family and membership in the moderately declining illegal group 
remains significant and positive. Again, being male reduces the probabilities of being 
in the low stable group compared to the low increasing group. The higher the future 
orientation, the greater the probability of membership in the low stable group and 
moderately declining group compared to the low increasing group. Age of onset is 
positively and significantly related to membership in the moderately declining group 
compared to the reference group. As expected, parental social index at baseline was 






Table 12 Membership in Illegal Work Trajectories - Providing a Good Home for Family 
 
† p<.10 * p<.05 **p< .01 *** p< .001 
Low increasing illegal group is the reference group 
 
   
Variable at baseline Coefficient t-score Coefficient t-score 
 1 2 
     
Low stable      
Providing a good home for family 0.219* 2.323 0.160 1.628 
Controls:     
Male - - -1.430** -3.289 
Age of onset - - 0.066 1.109 
Parent index of social position - - 0.008 0.981 
Impulse control - - 0.102 0.965 
Future orientation - - 0.492* 2.568 
Ƴ 2|1 1.606*** 7.633 0.051 0.042 
Ƴ 2|2 1.470*** 6.618 -0.136 -0.110 
Ƴ 2|3 2.103*** 7.777 0.351 0.281 
Ƴ 2|4 3.109*** 7.561 1.402 1.085 
Ƴ 2|5 2.684*** 8.973 1.018 0.809 
     
Moderate declining      
Providing a good home for family 0.259* 2.288 0.245* 2.056 
Controls:     
Male - - -0.575 -1.152 
Age of onset - - 0.155* 2.088 
Parent index of social position - - -0.010 -1.121 
Impulse control - - -0.217† -1.684 
Future orientation - - 0.442* 1.958 
Ƴ 3|1 0.972*** 4.110 -0.650 -0.437 
Ƴ 3|2 0.484† 1.828 -1.110 -0.732 
Ƴ 3|3 0.346 0.968 -1.525 -0.991 
Ƴ 3|4 1.718*** 3.805 -0.028 -0.018 
Ƴ 3|5 0.669† 1.775 -1.150 -0.745 
     
High declining      
Providing a good home for family 0.220 1.495 0.134 0.895 
Controls:     
Male - - 0.366 0.481 
Age of onset - - 0.123 1.332 
Parent index of social position - - -0.026* -2.132 
Impulse control - - -0.084 -0.524 
Future orientation - - 0.109 0.377 
Ƴ 4|1 -0.083 -0.291 -1.021 -0.537 
Ƴ 4|2 -0.728* -2.011 -1.579 -0.811 
Ƴ 4|3 -0.378 -0.924 -1.393 -0.713 
Ƴ 4|4 0.233 0.415 -0.867 -0.435 






 Table 13 shows the odds ratios and the probabilities associated with 
membership in the moderate declining illegal trajectory group compared to the low 
increasing illegal group. Recall that the difference between these two groups is that 
during the middle of the study period (around 20 years old), their trajectories intersect 
and the probability of engaging in illegal work for the moderately declining illegal 
group is almost zero by the end of the study period whereas the moderately increasing 
illegal group had about a .35 probability of engaging in illegal work by the end of the 
study period. For every one unit change in the expectations/aspirations gap of 
providing for one’s family, the odds of belonging to the moderately declining illegal 
group compared to the low increasing legal group is decreased by .27. Alternatively, 
members of the moderately increasing legal group have a 1.2 increase in odds of 
membership in the moderately declining illegal group compared to the low increasing 
illegal group. 
 
Table 13 Change in Odds of Membership from Each Legal Work Trajectory to the Moderate 
Declining Illegal Trajectory 
 
Providing for your family 
 Low stable Low increasing Mod declining Mod increasing High stable 
Odds 0.666 0.421 0.278 1.242 0.404 
Low increasing illegal group is the comparison group 
 
Research question two considered if legal economic opportunities might be 
related to the membership in particular illegal work groups, conditional on 
membership in particular legal groups. Drawing from previous literature, I focused on 
economic opportunities measured by three main concepts: neighborhood conditions, 





expectations and economic aspirations. Using an extension of the dual trajectory 
model, I found that the perception that it is easy for a young person to get a job was 
inversely related to membership in the high declining illegal group compared to 
membership in the low increasing illegal group. I also found that two items that 
capture the disjunction between expectations and aspirations were significantly 
related to at least one conditional probability: earning a good living and supporting 
one’s family. Additionally, several control variables (male, future orientation, 
parental socioeconomic index) emerged as significantly related to the conditional 
probabilities. These results provide preliminary support for arguments laid out my 
Sullivan (1989) and Agnew (2006) which suggests that the lack of legitimate 
opportunities and the disjunction between expectations and aspirations are related to 
the how legal work and illegal work are intertwined.  
Research Question Three: The Overlap and the Criminal 
Career 
 
 Research question three considers the legal and illegal overlap and its relation 
to criminal career dimensions. Specifically, I examine how involvement in the 
overlap compared to illegal work only is related to the frequency of offending 
(quantitative nature of offending) and offending variety (qualitative nature of 
offending).  
   Table 14 displays the descriptive information for the variables used to answer 
research question three. The measures are gathered from the recall level and pooled 
across the study period. The first important thing to note is that the main independent 





engaging in illegal work only. Therefore, the observations are restricted to 
observations where the respondent self-reported earning money from illegal activities. 
Table 14 shows that among observations that reported earning illegal money, the 
sample is evenly split, with about half engaging in the legal/illegal overlap and half 
engaging in illegal work only. The average age in this select sample was 20 years old 
and the vast majority were male (94%). Blacks comprised the largest ethnic group 
(45%) and the average age of onset was about 15 years of age. Although very few 
observations had children, about half self-reported being in a serious relationship. On 
average, drug dependency was fairly low but average ratings for deviant peer 






Table 14 Descriptive Information on Measures for Criminal Career Outcomes (n=1118 
Observations, 515 Individuals) 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min, Max 
Legal and illegal overlap vs. 
illegal only 
.509 - - 0, 1 
Instrumental offending rate 
(monthly) 
84.041 23.076 279.36 1, 5000 
Logged instrumental offending 
rate (monthly) 
2.933 3.181 1.860 -2.544, 8.517 
Instrumental offending rate no 
drug (monthly) 
10.095 .264 62.024 1, 128 
Logged instrumental offending 
rate no drug (monthly) 
.849 .635 1.870 -2.639, 7.525 
Instrumental offending proportion .723 .666 .229 .166, 1 
Instrumental offending variety  .266 .200 .176 0.1, 0.9 
     
Individual characteristics:     
Age 20.178 20 1.843 18, 26 
Male .937 - - 0, 1 
Philadelphia .564 - - 0, 1 
Black .441 - - 0, 1 
Hispanic .295 - - 0, 1 
Age of onset 14.986 15.11 1.656 9.1, 18.42 
     
Time varying characteristics:     
Number of children 0.603 0 .917 0, 6 
Relationship status 0.499 - .500 0, 1 
Drug dependency 1.728 0 2.685 0, 10 
Deviant peer behavior 2.400 2.42 .836 1, 5 
Neighborhood conditions 2.608 2.71 .812 1, 4 
Intrinsic rewards 2.396 1.57 2.392 0, 10 
 
 
Table 15 displays the mean and median monthly offending rate by age for 
observations of both legal and illegal work and illegal work only. Panel A includes all 
the instrumental offenses in the Pathways data. These offenses include: 1) entered or 
broken into a building to steal something, 2) stolen something from a store, 3) bought, 





illegally, 5) stolen a car or motorcycle to keep or sell, 6) sold marijuana, 7) sold other 
illegal drugs (i.e. cocaine, crack, heroin), 8) prostitution, 9) taken something from 
another by force, using a weapon 10) taken something from another by force, without 
a weapon. Panel B displays the frequency rates of instrumental offenses but drug 
selling (marijuana and other drugs) was excluded. In general, the median rate of 
instrumental offending was lower for the periods that participants were engaged in 
both legal and illegal work compared to periods of illegal work only. Consistent with 
some prior research, frequency of offending appears relatively stable over time for 
participants who remain criminally active (i.e. Loeber and Snyder, 1990) Panel B 
reveals that when drug selling is removed from the monthly offending rate, the 
frequency was greatly reduced. However, the frequency of offending of non-drug 
instrumental crimes for periods during the legal/illegal overlap remains less than 





Table 15 Monthly Rates of Self-Reported Instrumental Offending (Recall Level) 
 
There were a small number of observations that contained 0, which means that 
the participant indicated that they earned at least $1 illegally but did not endorse any 
of the crime types named in the Pathways to desistance study. About 10% of the 
sample had a value of 0 for the frequency of offending. It is possible that simply 
removing these observations from analyses would impact the consistency and 
unbiasness of the OLS estimator, perhaps due to issues with nonrandom sample 
selection. To explore this possibility, I estimated the same structural model using a 
Heckman (1976) sample selection correction and tested if the key parameter ρ = 0. 
Here ρ can be defined as the correlation between the error terms in the main equation 
and the sample selection equation, which should ideally equal zero if sample selection 
is exogenous.5 Here I failed to reject the null hypothesis that rho = 0 and therefore I 
                                                 
5 In the model specification, I did not fit the Heckman model with an exclusion restriction in the first 
stage, thereby relying on identification from functional form assumptions (Bushway, Johnson and 
Slocum, 2007). While I recognize the potential limitations of this omission for identification, I note 
that this test was done purely as a sensitivity check, and I was unable to reject the null, meaning I am 
not overly relying on potentially fragile parameter estimates from the selection model. 
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retained the OLS estimates and excluded the observations that contained 0 in the 
outcome – the instrumental crime rate.  
Due to the skew of the instrumental crime rate, I used the natural logarithm of 
the instrumental crime rate. I present the OLS results predicting logged monthly 
instrumental crime rate in Table 15. The analyses were conducted in three stages. The 
first stage looked at the bivariate relationship between being involved in both legal 
work and illegal work compared to being involved in illegal work only and the 
monthly instrumental crime rate. The second model includes individual 
characteristics of the participant and the third model included time-varying 
characteristics of the participant. Model 1 shows that being in both legal and illegal 
work compared to illegal work only was significantly related to offending frequency 
(β=-.676, p<.001). This result remains negative and significant across models 2 and 3.  
Specifically in model three, we can say that being in the overlap was related to 
lowering the average monthly offending frequency by 5%, holding all else constant. 
Several other variables emerged as significantly related to offending frequency. 
Males compared to females were more likely to engage in higher frequency of 
offending. Interestingly, the more children a participant had, the higher the frequency 
of instrumental offending. As expected drug dependency and deviant peer behavior 
was also positively and significantly related to frequency of offending. There were 
marginal effects for location and race: participants from Philadelphia compared to 
Phoenix increased the offending frequency and being Hispanic lowered offending 





intrinsic rewards to crime had no significant relationship with the frequency of 
offending. 
Table 16 OLS Model Predicting Logged Monthly Instrumental Crime Rate, Robust SE (n=1025, 
568 Individuals) 
 
Variable Co-efficient (SE) Co-efficient (SE) Co-efficient (SE) 
    
Both (illegal only reference category) -676 (.120)*** -.614 (.118)*** -.573 (.109)*** 
    
Individual characteristics:    
Age - -.045 (.034) -.062 (.034)Ɨ 
Male - .776 (.279)* .862 (.243)*** 
Philadelphia - .007 (.158) .330 (.173)Ɨ 
Black - .214 (.186) .174 (.186) 
Hispanic - -.298 (.189) -.321 (.187)Ɨ 
Age of onset - -.031 (.044) -.042 (.040) 
    
Time varying characteristics:    
Number of children - - .136 (.064)* 
Relationship status - - -.154 (.116) 
Drug dependency - - .101 (.024)*** 
Deviant peer behavior - - .431 (.072)*** 
Neighborhood conditions - - .037 (.079) 
Intrinsic rewards - - -.015 (.029) 
    
Constant 3.276 (.081)*** 3.898 (.978)*** 2.724 (.988)** 
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
 
Selling drugs is a crime that occurs more frequently than other instrumental 
crimes (Johnson et al., 1994). Thus, I also looked at the frequency of instrumental 
offending excluding the two drug selling items (selling marijuana and selling other 
drugs) to examine whether or not the effect of being engaged in both remained 
significant even when drug selling was removed (Table 17). Indeed, by removing the 
drug offenses, being in both legal work and illegal work compared to illegal work 
only still significantly related to the frequency of offending. That is, being in the 
overlap is associated with a lower average monthly offending frequency by 4%. 





peer behavior are associated with a higher offending frequency above and beyond 
drug selling.   
Table 17 . OLS Model Predicting Logged Monthly Instrumental Crime Rate Excluding Drug 








Both (illegal only reference category) -.300 (.159)Ɨ -.441 (.152)** -.400 (.144)** 
    
Individual characteristics:    
Age - -.059 (.045) -.0377 (.048) 
Male - -.054 (.272) -.103 (.298) 
Philadelphia - -.933 (.230)*** -.520 (.229)* 
Black - -.132 (.258) -.193 (.264) 
Hispanic - -.021 (.240) .008 (.228) 
Age of onset - .0425 (.051) .010 (.047) 
    
Time varying characteristics:    
Number of children - - -.063 (.095) 
Relationship status - - -.157 (.145) 
Drug dependency - - .082 (.027)** 
Deviant peer behavior - - .423 (.091)*** 
Neighborhood conditions - - .020 (.106) 
Intrinsic rewards - - .020 (.032) 
    
Constant 1.017 (.129)*** 2.160 (1.275) .601 (1.321) 
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Moving on to offending variety, Table 18 presents the descriptive information 
of the two measures I use to investigate offending variety: the proportion of 
instrumental crimes over all crimes and the variety of instrumental crimes, over the 
age profile. Several results were notable. Frist, the proportion of instrumental crimes 
hovers around .70, which means that over 70% of the offenses that the participants 
engaged in were instrumental crimes. Although this appears high, given that all the 
participants engaged in some form of illegal work to be included in the analyses, it is 
reasonable. Second, the proportion of instrumental crimes appears similar during 





instrumental crimes was fairly consistent across the age profile.  On the whole, the 
variety proportion of instrumental crimes is slightly higher for the legal/illegal 
overlap compared to illegal work only. There also does not appear to be a consistent 
trend across the age profile. 
Table 18 Instrumental Offending Variety by Age (n=1118) 
 
 
To examine the relationship between the legal/illegal overlap and offending 
variety, I conducted two ordinary least squares regressions. Instrumental offending 
proportion was the outcome of the first set of analyses (Table 19). Similar to 
offending frequency, the analyses were conducted in three stages: the first stage 
included the legal/illegal overlap, the second included the overlap and individual 
characteristics and the third stage included all the predictors. Results showed that 
being engaged in both legal/illegal work compared to illegal work only was not 
significantly associated with the instrumental offending proportion. In fact only three 
variables were significantly related to the instrumental offending proportion. Males 
compared to females had lower instrumental offending proportions. Similarly, deviant 
peer behavior and intrinsic rewards to crime were inversely related to instrumental 
offending proportions.  
 18 years 19 years 20 years 21 years 22 years 23 years 24 years 
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Proportion of instrumental crimes        
Legal/illegal overlap .709 .702 .725 .728 .711 .737 .716 
Illegal only .703 .739 .742 .698 .743 .725 .767 
        
Instrumental offending variety         
Legal/illegal overlap .281 .223 .232 .229 .258 .207 .237 





Table 19 OLS Model Predicting Proportion of Instrumental Crimes, Robust SE (n=1118, 515 
Individuals) 
 






    
Both (illegal only reference category) -.009 (.015) -.001 (.014) -.008 (.015) 
    
Individual characteristics:    
Age - .005 (.003) .005 (.004) 
Male - -.112 (.030)*** -.086 (.030)** 
Philadelphia - .008 (.020) -.014 (.023) 
Black - .024 (.024) .019 (.027) 
Hispanic - -.034 (.021) -.036 (.022)Ɨ 
Age of onset - -.001 (.005) -.005 (.005) 
    
Time varying characteristics:    
Instrumental offending rate (logged)   .002 (.004) 
Number of children - - -.004 (.009) 
Relationship status - - -.002 (.014) 
Drug dependency - - .003 (.002) 
Deviant peer behavior - - -.050 (.009)*** 
Neighborhood conditions - - -.021 (.010)Ɨ 
Intrinsic rewards - - -.010 (.003)** 
    
Constant .728 (.011)*** .716 (.115)*** .982 (.127)*** 
*p <.05 **p < .01 ***p <.001 
 
Table 20 displays the results of predicting the variety proportion of 
instrumental crimes. Again, this measures the different types of instrumental crimes 
an offender was engaged in. The denominator is the 10 aforementioned instrumental 
crimes and the numerator is the number of those crimes the respondent endorsed. 
Engaging in both legal/illegal work was inversely related to the number of 
instrumental crime types an individual endorses (p<.10), even when controlling for 
individual level and time varying factors. A number of individual factors were 
significantly related to the variety of instrumental crimes. Age, being from 
Philadelphia, Blacks and Hispanics were all inversely related the variety of 
instrumental crimes. As expected, instrumental offending rate and drug dependency 





deviant peer behavior and intrinsic rewards to crime were associated with greater 
variety of instrumental crimes.  
Table 20 OLS Model Predicting Variety of Instrumental Crimes, Robust SE (n=1118, 515 
Individuals) 
*p <.05 **p < .01 ***p <.001 
Summary of Results 
 
To recap, the current study had three main research questions. The first 
question was: Are there heterogeneous patterns of legal work and illegal work? What 
is the heterogeneity in joint development of legal and illegal work? To answer this 
question, I estimated group based trajectory models for legal work and illegal work. 
The joint development was examined through dual trajectory models. Findings 
suggest that there are very different pathways of legal work and illegal work over the 
study period. The relationship between the two pathways seems to largely follow an 
inverse pattern, suggesting optimistic results in terms of policy implications. 
Variable Co-efficient (SE) Co-efficient (SE) Co-efficient (SE) 
 1 2 3 
Both (illegal only reference category) .001 (.012) -.021 (.012)Ɨ -.009 (.010)Ɨ 
    
Individual characteristics:    
Age - -.008 (.002)** -.003 (.003) 
Male - .011 (.025) .020 (.022)Ɨ 
Philadelphia - -.090 (.016)*** -.054 (.017)** 
Black - -.058 (.019)** -.051 (.021)* 
Hispanic - -.055 (.019)** -.030 (.019)Ɨ 
Age of onset - -.002 (.004) -.001 (.004) 
    
Dynamic characteristics:    
Instrumental offending rate (logged)   .024 (.002)*** 
Number of children - - -.004 (.006) 
Relationship status - - -.006 (.010) 
Drug dependency - - .012 (.002)*** 
Deviant peer behavior - - .053 (.007)*** 
Neighborhood conditions - - -.001 (.007) 
Intrinsic rewards - - .012 (.002)*** 
    





Importantly though, results showed that on the whole, membership in the legal work 
group is not a strong predictor of the illegal work trajectory group and vice versa.  
Drawing on ethnographic work and the anomie/strain traditions and an 
extension of the dual trajectory model, my second research question examined 
whether or not legal economic opportunities alter the conditional probabilities 
between legal and illegal work. Findings suggest that legal economic opportunities 
(measured as perceived opportunities and the disjunction between economic 
expectations and economic aspirations) significantly altered the probability of 
membership in particular illegal groups, conditional on membership on particular 
legal groups. These findings indicate promising results and suggest that differential 
legal economic opportunities can potentially impact longitudinal patterns of illegal 
work. 
The last research question examined if participation in the legal and illegal 
work overlap was associated with the offending frequency and offending variety. 
Compared to being engaged in illegal work only, involvement in the overlap was 
associated with lower offending frequency. Although the proportion of instrumental 
crimes did not differ between engaging in the overlap compared to being involved 
with illegal work only, engaging in the overlap was associated with fewer types of 
instrumental crimes. Taken together, results suggest that the relationship between the 
legal/illegal overlap and criminal career dimensions is an important avenue for further 
inquiry. It is possible that being involved with the overlap is possibly one path to 
desistance, given its reduced frequency of offending. However, the qualitative nature 





instrumental crimes. This suggests that for individuals who engaged in the overlap, 






Chapter 5:  DISCUSSION 
 
Having a good job is supposed to have many important implications for 
offending. Theoretically, it is supposed to be a key factor in building conventional 
social capital, provide a sense of accomplishment, organize daily routines and be a 
source of informal social control (Sampson and Laub, 1993; Uggen, 2000). However, 
in reality, the relationship between employment and crime is quite complex. 
According to data from a national study, three-quarters of state inmates reported that 
they held a job just prior to their incarceration (Lynch and Sabol, 2001). As such, 
over the last couple of decades there has been a resurgence in custodial and 
noncustodial work programs. Unfortunately, evidence on the effectiveness of these 
programs in reducing recidivism is equivocal. To gain a more nuanced understanding 
of the relationship between legal and illegal work, the current study moved away 
from polarizing legal and illegal work and examined their interrelated nature, 
including their contemporaneous participation.  
Expanding inquiry beyond the bifurcation of legal and illegal work can 
provide a number of advantages. For example, investigation into the effect of legal 
economic opportunities and participation in illegal work has been an important 
avenue of inquiry for many scholars from the anomie tradition (i.e. Cloward and 
Ohlin, 1960; Merton, 1968). However, there has been an implicit assumption that as 
individuals take on illegal work as a result of blocked legal opportunities, they are 
disengaged from the legal market altogether. Acknowledging that legal and illegal 





step in future work on the relationship between legal economic opportunities and 
illegal work.    
Examining the legal/illegal overlap can also help with the further 
understanding of criminal careers. Blumstein et al. (1988: 2) define criminal careers 
as “the longitudinal sequence of offenses committed by an offender who has a 
detectable rate of offending during some period of time.” Since then, criminal careers 
have been characterized by a beginning (onset or initiation), duration (career length), 
frequency of offending and an end (desistance). Currently, the definition of 
criminal careers is couched in terms of sequences of discrete stages that are 
studied independently (Ulmer and Spencer, 1999). Better understanding of the 
complex relationship between legal and illegal work, including their overlap can 
help situate the overlap in the criminal career and possibly help better understand 
movement from one criminal career stage to another.    
The current study is one of the first to systematically investigate 
contemporaneous participation in legal and illegal work. Building on this type of 
inquiry can be informative not only for theory, but also for policy. For example, the 
current study uncovered heterogeneous patterns in legal work and illegal work among 
a sample of individuals who were charged with a felony offense at an especially 
young age (14 to 17 years old). Because of the select nature of the sample, it would 
be interesting to examine if the patterns uncovered in the current study are robust 
across various samples. Further, empirical work suggests that there are heterogeneous 
effects of custodial and noncustodial work programs. Investment in understanding 





potentially useful for understanding (non) effectiveness of custodial and non-
custodial work programs.  
The current study examined the overlap in three different ways. First, I 
estimated latent trajectory groups of legal work and illegal work. I examined the 
intertwined relationship between legal work and illegal work by using dual trajectory 
analysis, which provides three different representations of the linkage between legal 
and illegal work. One is the probability of membership in each of the legal work 
trajectory groups conditional on membership in each of the illegal work trajectory 
groups. The second is the reverse set of conditional probabilities: the probability of 
membership in each of the illegal trajectories conditional on membership in each of 
the legal trajectories. Finally, the joint probability of membership in a specific legal 
trajectory and a specific illegal trajectory group was estimated. Second, using an 
extension of the dual model, I tested if legal economic opportunities were associated 
with the probability of membership in particular illegal work groups, conditional on 
membership in particular legal work groups.  This allowed me to examine the 
relationship between legal economic opportunities and longitudinal patterns of illegal 
work while accounting for longitudinal patterns of legal work. Lastly, 
contemporaneous participation in legal and illegal work was examined by comparing 
engaging in the legal/illegal overlap to being engaged in illegal work only on two key 







Research Question One: Heterogeneity in Legal and Illegal 
Work  
 
Because the current study is one of the first studies to systematically examine 
the overlap between legal work and illegal work, the purpose of research question one 
was to uncover the longitudinal patterns both legal and illegal work, and how they 
were linked together over time. The legal work trajectory groups and the illegal work 
trajectory groups revealed that as expected, most groups increased the probability of 
participation in legal work and decreased the probability of illegal work over the age 
profile.  However, there were also a couple of pathways that emerged unexpectedly – 
the moderately declining legal group and the low increasing illegal group. Members 
of the moderately declining legal group (18%) actually decreased the probability of 
their participation as they approached the end of the study period and conversely, 
members of the low increasing trajectory group (11%) increased their participation in 
illegal work. Demographic profiles showed that both groups had the highest 
proportion of females but did not differ on any other demographic characteristics. 
Further investigation into the robustness of these particular groups among other 
samples would be an important next step.  
The dual trajectory analysis also demonstrated that legal work and illegal 
work unfold in heterogeneous ways. The probability of membership in various legal 
work groups were very different depending on membership in a particular illegal 
work group. Two general observations can be made from the results. First, there was 
an inverse relationship between legal work and illegal work. That is, the longitudinal 
patterns of legal and illegal work resembled a scissor effect whereby the rise in the 





probability of illegal work. This inverse relationship corroborates with much of the 
extant literature that posits that legal work is a turning point from illegal work (i.e. 
Sampson and Laub, 1993; Skardhamar and Savolainen, 2014) and provides an 
optimistic picture of the relationship between legal work and illegal work.  
Even though legal work participation and illegal work participation are 
inverse, there appears to me an incredible amount of overlap in participation. For 
example, the joint probabilities of being in both legal groups and illegal groups that 
had some participation was common. So, although an overall inverse trend can be 
seen, the trends between legal and illegal work is nuanced and does not comply to 
discrete states of legal or illegal means of earning money. This is in line with 
observations made by Freeman (1999) who argues that the lines between legal and 
illegal work are blurry and porous, rather than distinct and sharp. LaVigne (2014) and 
Petersilia (2003) also observed that the relationship between legal and illegal work is 
complicated and oftentimes overlapping.   
A second overarching finding gleaned from research question one is that some 
legal and illegal trajectories have relatively low co-occurrences. For example, the 
joint probability of membership in the moderate declining legal group and 
membership in the high declining illegal group was 0. Recall that the moderate 
declining legal group was a group that emerged as unexpected. It is informative to 
know that the relationship between the declining legal work participation however 
was not likely related to a consistently high participation in illegal work.  
On one hand, these general findings provide an optimistic picture of the 





particular sample, legal work and illegal work can be largely viewed as substitutes for 
one another. Freeman (1987) discusses the notion of substitution and complements in 
regard to legal and illegal work. He argues that, in the framework of standard labor 
supply models, if crime is more rewarding than legitimate work, it may substitute for 
employment and a negative relationship would be observed. Alternatively, a 
complementary process would be characteristic of legal and illegal work being 
positively related. Complementary processes are typical in white-collar crime and 
workplace crime. Future work should examine whether or not rewards from legal 
work may impact participation in the illegal market (and vice versa) through a 
substitution effect. Specifically, it would be interesting to ask whether or not 
individuals are responsive to changing incentives in monetary rewards by assessing 
participation in both legal and illegal markets.  
On the other hand, results from research question one also implies that the 
tradeoffs between legal work and illegal work might not be monolithic. Although 
there was a general inverse trend between legal and illegal work participation, there 
was also considerable heterogeneity in the ways in which legal and illegal work were 
linked over time. In addition to testing the robustness of the patterns of legal work 
and illegal work with other samples, important next steps are to consider factors that 
are related to both the heterogeneity of the singular patterns and factors that are 







Research Question Two: Legal Economic Opportunities 
 
For individuals who are neither fully committed to legal nor illegal markets, 
many drift between the two depending on the opportunities available at the time. 
Freeman (1996: 34) for example notes:  
“Many youths combine crime and work or shift between them readily. 
Because most criminals are self-employed, and because the U.S. job 
market has considerable flux, crime and legitimate work are not 
dichotomous choices for most young men. Joe holds a job, robs 
someone he meets on a dark empty street and sells drugs on the 
weekend”. 
 
Uggen and Wakefield (2008: 204) also note that among past offenders it is common 
to experience “spells of employment, supplemented by short spells of illegal work”. 
The purpose of research question two was to consider the relationship between legal 
economic opportunities and the probability of membership in various illegal work 
groups, conditional on membership in various legal work groups.  
There was some support for the notion that perceived legal economic 
opportunities were related to membership in higher illegal work groups. Three of the 
perceived legal economic opportunities emerged as significant.   The perception that 
it is easy for a young person to get a job in one’s neighborhood increased the 
probability of membership in the high declining illegal group compared with the low 
increasing illegal groups. Similarly, the extent to which exceptions fall short of 
earning a good living increased the probability of membership in the high declining 
group compared to the lower groups. These findings are consistent with prior work 
suggesting that structural constraints (i.e. Anderson, 1999; Horowitz, 1983; Sullivan, 





legal group membership, the findings are also consistent with the arguments of 
relative deprivation forwarded by Merton (1968). 
Interestingly, the disjunction between expectation/aspirations of providing for 
one’s family reduced the probability of membership in the moderately declining 
illegal group compared to the low increasing illegal group. Unlike the other two 
perceived legal economic opportunity measures, the relationship with this is not as 
clear because the differences between the moderately declining illegal group and the 
low increasing illegal group is not as distinct. Results generally indicate that the 
greater the expectation/aspirations gap for providing for one’s family, the less 
probable it is that there is a reduction in participation in illegal work by the end of the 
study period. Research on parenthood and criminal behavior have not produced 
consistent results. Some studies find that parenthood is likely a catalyst for moving 
away from criminal behavior (Kerr et al., 2011). Whereas, most other studies do not 
find evidence that desistance as a consequence of becoming a parent (Blokland and 
Nieuwbeerta 2005; Giordano et al. 2002; Sampson and Laub, 1993; Wakefield and 
Uggen 2008). In fact, Wakefield and Uggen (2008) find support for the strain 
hypothesis that having children increases illegal earnings among criminal offenders.  
Although three perceived legal economic opportunity measures emerged as 
significant, the majority of the measures did not. One possible reason is that the 
measures were taken from the baseline interview. Indeed perceptions of opportunities 
are unstable and can shift upwards or downwards as participants enter early adulthood 
and have experiences in both the legal market and the illegal market. North (2006) for 





However perceptions are extremely fragile and continually changing. Another 
drawback with using baseline perceived legal economic opportunity measures is that 
that the relationship between strain and deviance should be conditioned by the 
recency of the stress/strain (Agnew, 1992). By using baseline measures of a dynamic 
factor, it is likely that I did not capture the proximal effects of perceived economic 
opportunities. Related, I did not measure a key mediating factor – stress or strain as a 
result of the expectations/aspirations gap.6 Nonetheless, the results of the current 
study provide a promising springboard to further research examining the 
anomie/strain tradition with an outcome that has yet to be examined: engagement in 
both legal and illegal work.  
Overall, the results from these analyses provide some preliminary support that 
legal economic opportunities are related to membership in differential illegal work 
groups. The current study contributes to extant literature by examining the 
relationship between legal economic opportunities and the probability of engaging in 
illegal work while accounting for both the heterogeneity in the probability of 
engaging in illegal work and heterogeneity in the probability of engaging in legal 
work. Differential offending patterns by various subgroups of offenders have been 
routinely documented (i.e. Moffitt, 1992; Piquero, 2008) and differential patterns of 
labor market participation have similarly been documented (i.e. Huang et al., 2011; 
Hynes and Clarkberg, 2005). For example, Moffitt (1993) posits that life course 
persistent offenders not only offend at a relatively high rate over the life course but 
                                                 
6 There is some debate as to whether or not the psychological factor is a key component of the 
anomie/strain tradition. Despite being a central concept for Agnew, Merton argues that he never 






also “fail” across several life domains including education, marriage, and 
employment. Yet, extant research investigating the relationship between legal 
economic opportunities and illegal work participation rarely account for this 
heterogeneity. Failure to account for the heterogeneity can potentially downward bias 
the estimates as any effects for any subgroup are averaged out.  
Research Question Three: The Overlap and the Criminal 
Career 
 
Although the wealth of criminal careers research would suggest that every 
conceivable area of research is covered, there are important gaps that remain. One 
gap is movement towards understanding various patterns of offending. For example, 
how patterns of intermittency and overlap are situated in the offending career have 
been understudied. Research question three compared engaging in the legal/illegal 
overlap to engaging in illegal work only on two key criminal career dimensions: 
offending frequency and offending variety.  For this research question, I moved away 
from the group-based trajectory models and took a different analytic approach. The 
dependent variables in research question three were frequency of offending and 
offending variety. The main independent variable was engaging in the overlap 
compared to engaging in illegal work only during the recall period (as opposed to 
monthly observations). The analyses were cross-sectional and focused on between 
individual differences.  
Beginning with the seminal Philadelphia Birth Cohort Studies (Wolfgang et 
al., 1972) offending frequency has been of key interest to both theorists and policy 





offenders, scarce criminal justice resources can be used more efficiently (Horney and 
Marshall, 1991). The current study looked at monthly rates of instrumental offending 
– both including drug selling and excluding drug selling. Findings showed that the 
frequency of offending during periods of the overlap was significantly lower than 
during periods of illegal work only. There are potentially two explanations for this 
finding, although not mutually exclusive they emphasize different mechanisms. First, 
from a pure opportunity perspective of engaging in illegal work, having a legal job 
simply reduces the amount of time and the number of opportunities to participate in 
illegal work. A second explanation is having a legal job is a turning point in the 
desistance process (Sampson and Laub, 1993). Therefore, the overlap between legal 
work and illegal work is associated with a deceleration of illegal work because of 
investment in prosocial bonds. This lines up with Bushway et al.’s (2001) argument 
that since there is heterogeneity in offending patterns, there may be in fact different 
pathways to desistance. By measuring the rate of offending over time for multiple 
groups of offenders, researchers can potentially uncover various patterns in the 
desistance process. Although the current study used a cross-sectional approach to 
examining frequency of offending, it provides corroborative evidence that legal 
employment is associated with lower frequency of engaging in instrumental 
offending. 
In addition to frequency of offending, I considered whether or not engaging in 
the legal/illegal overlap was differentially related to offending variety. I measured 
offending variety in two different ways. First, I looked at the proportion of 





instrumental crimes make up the offender’s repertoire. I hypothesized that from a 
rational choice perspective, individuals who have legal jobs would likely only commit 
instrumental crimes to supplement their income. The disutility of losing one’s legal 
job due to being sanctioned for non-instrumental crimes would deter individuals from 
committing non-instrumental crimes. The findings however revealed that there were 
no significant differences in the proportion of instrumental crimes during periods of 
the overlap and periods of involvement in illegal work only.   
Second, I considered whether or not engaging in the legal/illegal overlap was 
associated with a greater variety of instrumental crimes. From a network perspective, 
it would be reasonable to hypothesize that engaging in both legal and illegal work 
would build greater social capital and provide greater opportunities to engage in 
different types of instrumental crimes. For example McGloin and Piquero (2009) 
found that offenders who had greater co-offender network redundancy were more 
likely to specialize in group crime but not when considering both solo and group 
crimes. Results from the current study showed that being involved in both legal and 
illegal work was associated with engaging in a fewer types of instrumental crimes.  
Taken together, periods of the legal and illegal overlap is characteristic of a 
lower frequency of offending and fewer types of instrumental crimes. It is possible 
that,   because offending is less frequent during the overlap, offenders only engage in 
the types of crimes that they are most proficient in. Engaging in fewer types of crimes 
has been associated with greater criminal skills and criminal returns (Loughran et al., 
2013; McCarthy and Hagan, 2001). One way to determine if offenders are engaging 





for individuals who engage in both legal/illegal work compared to those who engaged 
in illegal work only. Tremblay and Morselli (2001) spoke of individual efficiency 
ratios, which are payoffs per crime. For individuals who already have a legal job, the 
incentives to also engage in illegal work should be higher given that there is an 
alternate form of income (legal work).  
Examining offending frequency and offending variety provided some 
preliminary information regarding the legal/illegal overlap and criminal careers.  
However it did not give me a clear picture of how the legal and illegal overlap was 
situated in a participants’ longitudinal sequence of legal and illegal work. To look at 
this, I examined two respondents’ monthly participation in legal work and illegal 
work over 84 months (Appendix C). The two participants revealed very different 
patterns in how they navigated through their work states. From 18 to 20 years old, 
participant one transitioned between legal work and no work, however predominately 
engaging in legal work. For about one year (11 months) he/she spent engaged in the 
legal/illegal overlap. Afterwards, participant one returned to stable legal work. It 
appeared that for this individual, the legal/illegal overlap was an intermediate step in 
the distance process. 
Participant two demonstrated a more erratic pattern than participant one. 
He/she transitioned in and out of the various work states throughout the entire study 
period. From 18 to 20, he/she engaged in the legal/illegal overlap for six months. 
However, between the ages of 21 and 22, participant two was involved with stable 
legal employment for 17 months. Unfortunately, he/she returned illegal work and 





For participant two, stable employment did not appear to be a turning point. 
Unlocking these individual longitudinal patterns provide a very small glimpse of 
looking at how the legal/illegal overlap is embedded in an individual’s employment 
and offending career. By just selecting two participants, it is clear that patterns of 
legal and illegal work are complex and individualized.  
Understanding the various ways in which contemporaneous participation in 
legal work and illegal work fits into the criminal career is an important avenue of 
inquiry. For some individuals the overlap might be an intermediate step in the 
desistance process. Yet for others it might not be associated with the desistance 
process. The latter is highlighted by Sam Goodman, the thief interviewed by 
Steffensmeier and Ulmer (2005: 251):  
“It’s generally better to have a regular job. That way you have money 
coming in and won’t be under the gun to get cash quickly. It’s a cover, 
too, cause the cops will be less suspicious and all the way down the 
line you’re more likely to get a break. That is why I always told 
Rocky, the Beck boys, and different ones – get a job, even a part time 
job. Will keep the parole people happy, too. That, and having a 
woman. Will think you’re settling down and have somebody to get on 
your case.”  
 
This is similar to Carlsson’s (2012) findings with intermittent offenders. Carlsson 
(2012) interviewed male offenders from The Stockholm Life Course Project and 
found two qualitatively different forms of intermittent offending. The first was 
characteristic of temporary disruptions or breaks in offending, where the offender 
ceases offending for a short amount of time but there was no commitment to any 
long-term change in offending. The other form of intermittent offending was viewed 
as failed attempts at desistance. This form of intermittency is associated with a desire 





 The current study is among the first to examine heterogeneity in both legal 
and illegal work. Although in its early infancy, further work into this line of inquiry 
can potentially provide some insights into issues of the effectiveness of work 
programs. Over the last 25 years, many programs have been designed and 
implemented with the purpose of increasing employment and reducing recidivism 
among ex-offenders. Unfortunately, the conclusions from these evaluations have 
generally been disappointing (Bushway and Reuter 2002; Uggen et al. 2002). Further 
examination of the heterogeneity in the patterns of legal and illegal work and the 
factors that contribute to the heterogeneity can provide insight into why some of these 
programs did not produce intended outcomes.  
Uggen’s (2000) reanalysis of the National Supported Work Demonstration 
Project is an example of how taking into accounting for heterogeneity can provide 
important insight into the effectiveness of work programs. Uggen divided the sample 
into subjects 26 years of age and younger and those 27 and older and results revealed 
that there were significant employment effects for subjects over the age of 27. 
According to Visher et al. (2005: 302), “the significance of the age of participant in 
the success of the employment program, is an important step forward in the 
disappointing 20-year history of job training and employment programs for ex-
offenders”. Despite these optimistic results, there have been few concerted efforts in 









The current study was a first systematic look at the relationship between legal 
and illegal work, focusing on their contemporaneous participation. As one of the first 
systematic studies, it provided an important springboard for future work examining 
the relationship between legal and illegal work. However, as with most studies, there 
are limitations associated with the current study.  
First, the participants in the Pathways to Desistance Study are a select group 
of individuals, for whom results cannot be generalized to any other group. Eligibility 
for the study was contingent on being charged with a felony offense between the ages 
of 14 to 17. This is advantageous given that it is an offending sample with a high 
prevalence of problem behaviors, including illegal work. However, it is important to 
examine the robustness of the patterns uncovered in this sample with other offending 
samples and general population samples. One dataset that might be a good starting 
point is the National Supported Work Demonstration project, which was a program 
that provided basic, transitional job opportunities to individuals who are traditionally 
difficult to employ: ex-offenders, former drug addicts, women who were long-term 
recipients of welfare benefits (AFDC), and school dropouts. Similar to the Pathways 
study, monthly information regarding key dimensions of the respondent’s life were 
collected. Respondents provided information on monthly drug use, income, and crime 
information at 9‐month intervals. All respondents were tracked for at least 18 months, 
with some respondents tracked for up to 36 months. 
The focus of the current study was participation in legal work and illegal 





additional information regarding the interrelationship between legal work and illegal 
work. For example, intensity of participation measured by the time spent in legal and 
illegal work can provide further insight into how the two activities are intertwined.  
Similarly, the type of legal work and the type of illegal work that participants 
engaged in could provide a look into the qualitative nature of the legal and illegal 
work overlap. Secondary labor markets are characteristic of jobs which require little 
training, cluster at the low end of the wage scale, have little or no mobility 
opportunities, and have rapid turnover (Crutchfield and Pitchford, 1997). These 
secondary labor markets are also characteristic of movement between legal, informal 
and illegal work (Sullivan, 1989). Thus examining the quality of legal work could 
provide commentary on secondary labor market processes and contexualize findings 
regarding dual participation in legal and illegal work.  
Finally, research question two examined the relationship between legal 
economic opportunities and the probability of membership in particular illegal work 
groups, conditional on membership in particular legal groups. The method used to 
examine research question two allowed the conditional probabilities between legal 
and illegal work to vary as a function of legal economic opportunities but the model 
does not allow for the risk factors to be time varying. Therefore, I used measures of 
perceptions of legal economic opportunities taken at baseline. The limitation of this is 
that perceptions of legal economic opportunities are not static and more proximate 
measures would be ideal. Moreover, I used the disjunction between economic 
expectations/aspirations as a measure of legal economic opportunities, which has 





the current study focused exclusively on economic offending and adhered more to 







Chapter 6:  CONCLUSION 
 
The current study started with the goal of studying what Sviridoff and 
Thompson (1983) describe as work that is concurrent with crime, which occurs when 
work and crime are not mutually exclusive activities. Although the overlap is inherent 
in white collar crime and organized crime, inquiry into the overlap between legal and 
illegal work for more common types of offending is scant. The current study is 
among the first to systematically study the interrelated nature of legal and illegal 
work, focusing on their overlap. Results from the current study demonstrate that there 
are heterogeneous patterns in participation in both legal work and illegal work and the 
ways in which they contemporaneously evolve over time. These results corroborate 
with Sviridoff and Thompson’s (1983) and Freeman’s (1999) arguments that the 
relationship between legal and illegal work is complex. This complexity however has 
been understated in extant literature, even though there has been a wealth of studies 
that examine the relationship between work and crime.  
 Recent work on employment focuses on barriers to obtaining employment (i.e. 
Kurlychek, Brame and Bushway, 2006; Nakamura and Blumstein, 2009; Pager, 
2003). Indeed, ex-offenders face monumental challenges in obtaining legal 
employment with problems associated with background checks, substance use, poor 
human capital, and few prosocial connections (Maruna, 2001).  However, the current 
study suggests that there might be considerations beyond getting a job that are 
important to becoming crime free.  Western (2002) argues that most ex-offenders are 
ultimately able to find employment after release, but the jobs they get offer little wage 





a job, even getting hired, often is not enough. Research underscores the importance of 
sufficient wages and directs our focus to not just job acquisition, but job retention.” It 
is important to continue to investigate the complexities between legal and illegal 
work. Unpacking these complexities, such as the legal and illegal overlap, can 
potentially help with understanding why work programs have not been effective at 
moving offenders away from illegal work, even though theoretically the relationship 
between legal and illegal work should be an inverse one.  
Research on deterrence and decision making can provide an example of 
exemplary work that investigates a complex phenomenon. Early work on deterrence 
and crime suggested that there were negligible deterrent effects (Paternoster, 1987).   
However, as researchers wrestled with conceptual issues and began unraveling the 
factors that condition the relationship between perceived certainty, perceived severity 
and offending, the evidence for deterrence became stronger (Nagin, 1998). More 
recently, scholars of the deterrence doctrine found that aggregating the population 
downward biases any deterrent effect because there are different kinds of people for 
whom the relationship between perceived risk and offending operate differently 
(Pogarsky, 2002). Further, scholars are uncovering that the functional form between 
perceived risk and offending are non-linear (Loughran et al., 2012). Comparatively 
speaking, the literature on legal and illegal work is still in its infancy and offers a 
















Probability of legal work group conditional on illegal work group 
 







Low Stable .244 .184 .212 .170 .194 
Low Increasing .355 .302 .110 .054 .179 
Mod Declining .427 .232 .098 .142 .103 
High Declining  .460 .210 .000 .147 .183 
  
Probability of illegal work group conditional on legal work group 
 







Low Stable .513 .570 .818 .725 .713 
Low Increasing .130 .161 .073 .040 .113 
Mod Declining .262 .205 .108 .174 .109 
High Declining  .093 .062 .000 .059 .064 
  
Joint probability of legal work group and illegal work group 
 







Low Stable .155 .118 .136 .109 .125 
Low Increasing .039 .033 .012 .060 .020 
Mod Declining .079 .043 .018 .026 .019 
High Declining  .028 .013 .000 .090 .011 







Appendix B. Incentives Associated with the Legal and Illegal 
Overlap 
 
Ethnographic work and empirical work consistently note the important role 
that limited economic opportunities in legitimate employment play in an individual’s 
decision to take on illegal work. Fagan (1999) emphasized that economic structural 
constraints can allow individuals to view crime as a valid form of work. Similarly, 
Sullivan (1989) applied segmented labor market theory to explain differential work 
patterns across neighborhoods. Segmented labor market theory suggests that there are 
at least two labor markets: primary, which includes steady and well-paying 
employment and secondary, which includes low-wage jobs, informal work, and 
crime. Activities in the secondary market must be alternated as none of the activities 
alone are sufficient to make a living. Freeman (1999) observed that among 
disadvantaged young people in the 1980s that the division between illegal and legal 
work is not clear cut. Some persons commit crimes while employed – doubling up 
their legal and illegal work. Some young people may view criminal activities as an 
attractive alternative to legitimate labor market opportunities. These youth may 
consider all available economic opportunities - both legal and illegal.  
Rational choice perspectives explicitly discuss the notion of incentives: 
criminals respond to incentives just like non-criminals and therefore an individual’s 
decision to engage in illegal work is not qualitatively different from his/her decision 





greatest utility will be selected among alternatives. Thus, the decision to commit 
crime will be influenced by the financial returns it offers in comparison to competing 
legal opportunities. This is evident in time allocation models. For example, Ehrlich 
(1975) argued that the decision to engage in illegal activity is not inherently an 
either/or choice. Rather individuals combine various legal and illegal activities or 
switch from one to another throughout their lifetime. Time allocation models regard 
crime as a form of work. Grogger (1998: 758) notes, “consumers decide how much 
crime to commit and how much to work on the market as a function of their returns to 
crime.” He further argues that almost everyone in his sample (NLSY) worked in the 
legal labor market and thus “the goal of [his] model should be to explain crime in a 
world in which almost everyone works on the labor market” (p. 759). As such, 
Grogger (1998) assumed that an individual will choose to work if the market wage 
offer exceeds the reservation wage, which is the lowest wage a person is willing to 
earn to participate in an activity. 
Scholars have also commented on how incentives in the form of wages are an 
important reason why many ex-offenders return to illegal work. LaVigne (2014) most 
recently noted that parolees who earned less than $7 per hour were twice as likely to 
return to prison compared to those who earned more than $10 an hour. This 
observation is in line with a rational choice perspective and draws attention to the 
idea of a shifting reservation wage, which Grogger (1998) also highlighted. Western 
(2002) argued that beyond finding employment, ex-offenders are faced with limited 





little mobility and opportunities to gain human capital is perhaps the key reasons why 
ex-offenders return to illegal work.  
Incentives in legal and illegal work can have important consequences. For 
example, success in criminal endeavors can actually encourage persistence in 
offending.  The perceptual deterrence and rational choice literature is that while an 
inverse relationship between the perceived sanctions is relatively weak compared to 
the association between perceived rewards and criminal (e.g. Cornish and Clarke, 
1986; Paternoster and Simpson, 1993; Loughran et al., 2012; Piliavin et al., 1986). 
Importantly, these studies suggest is that offenders are highly responsive to rewards 
from crime. In other words, rewards from crime may have a positive impact on 
criminal career length. Both Shover and Thompson (1992) and Sommers, Baskin, and 
Fagan (1994) found that the probability of desistance increases when offenders’ 
expectations for achieving rewards from criminal activity decline. Paternoster and 
Bushway (2009) examine cognitive appraisals and suggest that commitment towards 
crime declines as an offender is encounters failures at criminal activity (see also 
Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph, 2002). Pezzin (1995) found that current and 
expected illegal earning prospects were negatively and significantly associated with 
the probability of desistance. Similarly, Shover and Thompson (1986) argued that if 
the expectations of illegal earnings are high, the likelihood of desistance is lowered. 
 Examining illegal incentives are particularly important because the legal and 
illegal work overlap can provide greater returns to crime and incentive to remain 
involved in illegal work. By remaining in both legal and illegal work, offenders are 





competitive in both the legal and illegal labor market. Scholars have long documented 
that conventional human capital results in greater returns in the legal labor force 
(Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1958). Similarly, offenders with greater criminal capital reap 
greater returns to crime (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy and Hagan, 2001). As such, 
the study will document the legal and illegal wage rate across the age profile for the 
various trajectory groups. 
Coding of Incentive Variables:  
 
Weekly legal wage rate: Researchers suggest that some offenders supplement their 
legal income with illegal income (Reuter et al., 1990; Sviridoff and Thompson, 1983). 
I expect that individuals with higher legal earnings are less likely to be engaged in 
illegal work.  The legal wage rate was calculated by dividing a participant’s total 
reported illegal earnings during the month the total number of weeks worked across 
all legal jobs. The number of weeks were calculated by multiplying each week the 
participant worked by 1.3 to account for the fact that all months are not exactly four 
weeks long (52 weeks in a year / 12 months in a year = 4.333 weeks per month) 
(Loughran et al., 2013).  
Weekly illegal wage rate: According to the rational choice perspective, lucrative 
illegal earnings will likely create an incentive to participate in illegal work. Similar to 
the legal wage rate, the illegal wage rate represents the total amount of money made 
from illegal activities during each month of the recall period by the number of weeks 





Intrinsic rewards: Intrinsic rewards is the score is a mean score of 7 items. 
Participants were asked how much 'thrill' or 'rush' is it to do any of the following 
things: Fighting, robbery with gun, stabbing someone, breaking into a store or home, 
stealing clothes from a store, vandalism, auto theft. If the youth never participated in 
any of these things, he/she was asked to rate for how much 'thrill' or 'rush' he/she 
thinks it would be. The responses ranged from 0 (no fun or kick at all) to 10 (a great 
deal of fun or kick) (Nagin and Paternoster, 1994). 
I plot the incentives associated with the various legal and illegal trajectory 
groups over time. By juxtaposing the legal work group trajectories and illegal wage 
rate among members in the legal work group (and vice versa) I can descriptively look 
at how the incentives in one market are related to participation in the other market. I 




Figure 1 displays the legal work trajectory groups and the median illegal wage 
rates conditional on membership in the respective legal trajectory group. As expected, 
the high stable legal group is associated with low illegal wage rates. The moderately 
decreasing legal group however displays a scissor effect whereby the trends in the 
probability of participation in legal work crisscrosses with the trend in illegal wage 
rates. The moderately declining legal group follows a stable pattern with the illegal 
wage rates until wave 7 and the two patterns diverge – the probability of legal work 
















Figure 2 shows the illegal work trajectories and the median legal wage rates 
conditional on membership in the respective illegal trajectory group. One striking 
difference between patterns of legal wage rates is that they are remarkably similar 
across the illegal work groups. This suggests that wages from the legal sector do not 















Figure 3 displays the perceived intrinsic rewards associated with various 
offense types.  It appears that the intrinsic rewards to crime remain relatively similar 
when conditional on legal work trajectory groups. As expected, for the high stable 
legal group, the average ratings of intrinsic rewards decline as the probability of legal 
employment increases. Similarly the low increasing legal group slightly declined their 
average intrinsic reward rating as the probability of legal work increased. The 
moderate declining group appears to increase their intrinsic reward ratings as the 
probability of legal work decreased. Thus intrinsic rewards to crime appeared to be 
inversely related to the probability of participation in illegal work. 














Figure 4 examines intrinsic rewards to crime conditional on illegal work 
trajectory groups. The high declining group and the moderate declining group had the 
most stable intrinsic reward ratings of the four illegal work groups (across recall 
periods). There were slight declines in the mean ratings of intrinsic rewards to crime 
among members of the low increasing and low stable illegal groups. It is important to 
note that there was not a lot of variation around the mean intrinsic reward ratings for 
both legal work groups and illegal work groups. 



















































Both ethnographic work and rational choice literature emphasize the role of 
incentives in the decision to engage in both legal and illegal work contemporaneously 
(i.e. Freeman, 1999; Grogger, 1998; Sullivan, 1989). I took a first step at looking at 
illegal incentives and participation in legal work and vice versa. I examined two types 
of illegal incentives: monetary and intrinsic rewards. There were three main findings 
in these preliminary analyses. 
 First, legal employment and illegal weekly wages are generally inversely 
related. That is, higher illegal wages is associated with a lower probability of 
participation in legal work. Alternatively, legal wages remained unrelated to the 
probability of participation in illegal work. Legal wages increased over the recall 





associated with the lowest legal wages out of the four groups. Finally, intrinsic 
















































































































































































Legal Only 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illegal Only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Both 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 


































































































































Legal Only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Illegal Only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Both 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 








































































































































































Legal only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Illegal only 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Both 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 






















































































































Legal only 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illegal only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Both 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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